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From the Secretary, Department of Justice 
Family violence is a significant community safety issue. Raising public awareness of the problem 
and taking steps to address it is a key priority for the department.   
In a small but nonetheless significant number of situations, a person may kill in response to family 
violence or a person may kill as their last act of family violence. Family violence is also a factor in 
other criminal offences such as assaults and rape.  
Victoria’s Action Plan to Address Violence against Women and Children was launched in October 
2012 with the central tenet that violence against women and children in any form and in any 
community is unacceptable. The Action Plan continues to guide work across government in relation 
to preventing family violence, holding perpetrators accountable and making sure women and 
children are safe.  
The department provides programs and services such as the Victims of Crime Helpline and the 
Victims Assistance and Counselling Program managed by the Victims Support Agency to assist 
victims of family violence. Victims are also supported through legislation, such as the Family 
Violence Protection Act 2008. 
The department, in partnership with Victoria Police, courts and other justice agencies, has recently 
strengthened the system’s response to family violence. Recent initiatives include: 
 introducing new indictable offences with increased penalties (a maximum of five years’ 
imprisonment) for repeated and serious breaches of Family Violence Intervention Orders and 
Family Violence Safety Notices. . 
 increased funding of $500,000 per year to increase the number of people who can be assisted 
by court-mandated Men’s Behaviour Change programs, almost doubling the current capacity of 
the program, and  
 introducing legislative amendments to extend Family Violence Safety Notices (issued by 
police) from 72 hours to 120 hours, maximising access to legal advice and court listing 
days.  
I welcome other important initiatives over the last two years such as the Victoria Police Enhanced 
Service Delivery Model and the best practice policy on prosecuting in family violence cases 
developed by the Office of Public Prosecutions (OPP). Victoria Police’s approach provides a more 
targeted response to repeat victims and recidivist family violence offenders. The OPP policy assists 
in creating a deeper understanding of the dynamics of family violence – helping legal practitioners 
and the judiciary contribute to improving the overall effectiveness of the criminal justice system in 
dealing with family violence. 
The proposals for changes to laws presented in this paper offer significant opportunities for Victoria 
to improve the operation of the criminal justice system in relation to homicide offences in particular 
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From the Director, Criminal Law Review 
Over the last decade, homicide laws in Australia have undergone significant change.  Some 
jurisdictions have abolished provocation. Some jurisdictions have made changes to self-defence 
laws. A number of reviews have been conducted on various aspects of homicide laws and some 
are currently underway.  
Murder is the most serious offence we have. Any defence, partial defence or excuse to the 
offence of murder requires close scrutiny. At the same time, the way in which our laws operate in 
certain situations has been called into question. Laws that developed in the context in which 
men kill often did not adapt well to provide substantive equality for women who kill in self-
defence. 
The recommendations in the Victorian Law Reform Commission’s Report in 2004 on Defences 
to Homicide and the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 resulted in significant changes to the law. They 
also sought to engender cultural change, especially in relation to understanding the dynamics of 
family violence. Cultural change in particular requires renewed effort to sustain this change. This 
paper provides an opportunity to assess the impact of such changes and considers ways of 
continuing the process of review and further improvement of our criminal justice system.  
This examination has resulted in proposals to further improve the way in which homicide laws 
operate, together with draft provisions showing how these proposals could be implemented in 
legislative form. Whether defensive homicide should be retained or abolished raises important 
and difficult policy issues. How it works in practice and what might happen if it is abolished 
warrants careful consideration.    
A further issue concerns how evidence laws work in homicide trials where questions are asked 
about homicide victims. The abolition of provocation has reduced the problem of ‘victim blaming’ 
in homicide cases, but it remains a problem. This paper asks whether new laws should be 
introduced to address this problem and includes draft provisions setting out how such changes 
could be made. 
In response to the department’s Discussion Paper on defensive homicide, we received many 
helpful and thoughtful submissions. I would like to thank everyone who made a submission to 
the department. These submissions and the many relevant academic writings on these issues 
significantly assisted the development of proposals for reform set out in this paper.  
I would also like to thank past and present members of Criminal Law Review who contributed to 
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The purpose of this paper 
In August 2010, the Department of Justice released a Discussion Paper which involved a review of 
the offence of defensive homicide. The Discussion Paper covered a range of issues and asked nine 
specific questions. The Discussion Paper also asked a general question to elicit other ideas for 
improvement to defensive homicide, homicide and parts of the criminal justice system connected to 
these offences. 
This Consultation Paper contains proposals for legislative reform, and asks several questions, in 
relation to issues considered in the Discussion Paper and addresses some consequential issues. It 
includes draft legislative provisions to illustrate the way in which the proposals and questions could 
be enacted. This will facilitate consideration of the proposals and questions, and enable interested 
persons to comment on them.  
With the benefit of further submissions, the department will then provide advice to the Attorney-
General concerning possible legislative reform of defensive homicide and related issues.  
How to make a submission 
If you wish to comment on the matters raised in this paper, you can make a written submission.  
Please email or post your submission to: 
Defensive Homicide: Submissions 
Department of Justice 
GPO Box 4356 
Melbourne Vic 3001 
E. clr@justice.vic.gov.au 
If you have any questions regarding the submission process, call (03) 8684 0873. 
Please note: 
Unless marked ‘private and confidential’ all correspondence and submissions will be regarded as 
public documents, and may be made available on the Department of Justice’s website, or be viewed 
by members of the public on request.  
Even if a submission is marked ‘private and confidential’ the submission is still subject to the 
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) (FOI Act). However, it should be noted that 
the FOI Act requires the department, if practicable, to notify you if a request is made for access to a 
document containing information relating to your personal affairs and, if a decision is made to 
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Defensive homicide has now been in operation in Victoria for more than seven years. In recent 
years, it has attracted considerable public attention. This has included the criticism that it is not 
producing the results that were intended and calls for its abolition. 
The first step in the department's review of defensive homicide led to the publication of a Discussion 
Paper in August 2010. While defensive homicide is the primary focus of the review, the review also 
considers the operation of self-defence more generally and the way in which the criminal justice 
system works in cases where a woman kills in response to family violence.  
Since the Discussion Paper, the number of defensive homicide convictions has increased from 13 to 
28. This has included the conviction of three women for the offence of defensive homicide. These 
cases, as well as cases in which men have been convicted of defensive homicide, shed further light 
on the operation of the reforms introduced by the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005. 
The data from the 28 convictions for defensive homicide indicates that: 
 the overwhelming majority of offenders were men (25 out of 28) 
 the overwhelming majority of victims were men (26 out of 27) 
 all three female offenders killed a man (3 out of 3) 
 a minority of offenders had a family relationship with the victim (7 out of 28) 
 a majority of the intimate partner killings were by women (3 out of 4) 
 the majority of offenders pleaded guilty (19 out of 28), and 
 the majority of female offenders pleaded guilty (2 out of 3).  
These figures should be considered in the context of family violence killings. The Australian Institute 
of Criminology found that in 2008–09 and 2009–10: 
 66% of domestic homicides were intimate partner homicides 
 88% of all homicide offenders were men and 12% were women, and 
 68% of all homicide victims were men and 32% were women.   
A number of criticisms of defensive homicide concern the structure of the offence and 
suggestions that excessive self-defence would be better recognised as a partial defence to 
murder (resulting in a conviction for the offence of manslaughter), rather than an offence. This 
also raises the issue of the complexity of defensive homicide and excessive self-defence. In Part 
2 of this paper, the department has identified ways in which the complexity of defensive 
homicide could be reduced. However, there is an irreducible level of complexity involved in any 
form of excessive self-defence.  
Changes to reduce the complexity of defensive homicide are unlikely to make any significant 
difference from a policy perspective to the outcomes of the application of defensive homicide. 
Excessive self-defence was recommended by the VLRC as a 'safety-net' to support women 
pleading not guilty to murder and manslaughter and running a complete self-defence case. Whether 
a ‘safety-net’ is required depends upon the effectiveness of complete self-defence in the context of 
a woman who kills in response to family violence. The changes to self-defence in the context of 
family violence appear to have made a difference. However, it is not possible to draw definitive 
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conclusions about how defensive homicide is likely to continue to be used by women in the future, 
from the small number of cases to date.  
For instance, of the three women convicted of defensive homicide to date, the Court of Appeal said 
that one woman fell outside the parameters of murder by a narrow margin and it could be argued 
that another woman potentially had a good case for self-defence but pleaded guilty to defensive 
homicide instead. However, it is very difficult to comment about such cases without seeing and 
hearing all of the evidence or the decisions that lawyers must make in deciding whether to advise 
their clients to plead guilty or not guilty. Further, the number of cases is insufficient to identify any 
discernible trend. 
One of the questions posed in the Discussion Paper was how effective self-defence would be where 
the threat faced was not immediate. All three of the defensive homicide cases involving female 
offenders involved an immediate threat. Accordingly, the new laws have not been tested in this 
situation.     
In over seven and a half years of operation, there has been one trial where a woman was convicted 
of defensive homicide and two women have pleaded guilty to defensive homicide. To obtain a small, 
but potentially sufficient, sample of defensive homicide trials involving women, there would need to 
be at least 10 trials. At the current rate, it would take 75 years before 10 women would be convicted 
of defensive homicide at trial. Accordingly, it would appear to require too long a period of time for 
definite conclusions to be drawn based on the data where women are accused, particularly since 
during that period, at the current rate, 250 men would be convicted of defensive homicide at a trial 
or by plea of guilty. 
Accordingly, it is important to consider defensive homicide both in policy terms as well as how it 
applies when men kill.  
From a policy perspective, the VLRC acknowledged that its consultations revealed that there was 
both support for, and opposition to, recognising excessive self-defence. Submissions received in 
relation to the department’s Discussion Paper also revealed mixed views about defensive homicide 
from a purely policy perspective.      
In some ways, defensive homicide distorts homicide laws and has unintended effects. The existence 
of defensive homicide shifts the focus of debate from the adequacy of complete self-defence to 
defensive homicide. This creates a real risk that the existence of defensive homicide suggests that a 
woman who kills in response to family violence is not acting reasonably, or will often not be acting 
reasonably, and therefore it is better to plead guilty to defensive homicide than raise self-defence at 
a trial.  
On balance, the department considers that it is difficult to conclude that this defence clearly works to 
the benefit of women who kill in response to family violence. Accordingly, it is not clear that it 
achieves its intended objective. Further, defensive homicide may work to the detriment of women 
who kill in response to family violence and its existence may inhibit attempts to drive further cultural 
change in considering the situation of women who kill in response to family violence. 
There is clear evidence that defensive homicide inappropriately provides a partial excuse for men 
who kill. Defensive homicide is primarily relied upon by men who kill. In many of these cases, men 
have killed in circumstances which are very similar to those where provocation previously applied.  
For the following principal reasons, the department proposes that the partial defence of defensive 
homicide be abolished: 
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 it is inherently complex, making it difficult for judges and juries, and the community, to 
understand and apply 
 there is no clear benefit to having defensive homicide as part of the legal framework for 
women who kill in response to family violence, and 
 it inappropriately excuses killing by men.  
To date, men have comprised 25 of the 28 convictions for defensive homicide. The price of having 
defensive homicide for the comparatively small number of women who kill is substantially 
outweighed by the cost of inappropriately excusing men who kill.  
Self-defence 
The 2005 reforms to self-defence included setting out the social context evidence that is relevant in 
cases of family violence. This was a significant and important change. However, defensive homicide 
may detract from the position that a woman who kills in response to family violence should rely on 
self-defence laws. 
The ability to introduce social context evidence to better understand family violence, its dynamics 
and its effects was limited to homicide offences. Self-defence may be relevant to many other 
offences and family violence may be a relevant factor in considering self-defence in relation to other 
offences. For instance, a woman who attempts to kill or cause serious injury to her partner in 
response to family violence should also be able to adduce social context evidence to explain why 
she was acting in self-defence.  
Accordingly, the department proposes removing the limit on using social context evidence laws only 
in homicide cases. Such evidence should be available wherever self-defence may be raised. 
Further, greater use of social context evidence in relation to a number of offences should result in 
the legal profession and the courts: 
 being more familiar with the laws governing this kind of evidence, and 
 better understanding the ways in which this kind of evidence may be relevant. 
In turn, this should improve the effectiveness of social context evidence laws when used in 
homicide cases.       
The proposals in this paper include having one test for self-defence which applies to all offences (as 
was the case before 2005). Even before defensive homicide laws were introduced, Victoria’s self-
defence laws differed from those in other jurisdictions in Australia. Most other states in Australia 
have changed their test for self-defence. The second limb of the common law test focused on 
whether the person had reasonable grounds for believing it was necessary to do what they did. The 
VLRC Report recommended that this be changed to the test used in other jurisdictions, including 
New South Wales. That test is whether the person’s response was reasonable in the circumstances 
as perceived by them.  
The VLRC recommendation provides a more objective test as it focuses on the person’s response, 
rather than their grounds for believing action was necessary. However, it is not fully objective 
because, like the common law test, it must be determined in accordance with the circumstances as 
perceived by the person.  
The paper includes a discussion of both of these proposals and asks whether Victoria should adopt 
the common law test or the test recommended by the VLRC. 
                                   Defensive Homicide 
 




Evidence about homicide victims 
A number of submissions identified problems with the evidence that is led in some homicide trials 
about homicide victims. The abolition of provocation may have reduced ‘victim blaming’, but it 
continues to be a problem. This paper suggests two new ways of tackling this issue. First, by 
modifying existing laws concerning ‘improper’ questions (e.g. questions that are offensive, 
demeaning or based on stereotypes) so that they apply to questions asked about a homicide victim. 
This would prohibit these questions unless they are necessary in the interests of justice. Secondly, 
by adapting character evidence laws to enable the prosecution to lead evidence in rebuttal to 
address issues raised about the victim that bear on the issues in the case. 
These two potential reforms aim to limit victim blaming and inappropriate questioning. Sometimes 
questions which may be regarded as offensive or damaging to the victim’s reputation are integral to 
the issues in dispute in the case. These potential reforms would not prevent such questions from 
being asked if they are relevant and necessary as part of the accused’s defence. However, where 
this evidence concerns the homicide victim’s character, the possible reforms would enable the 
prosecution to lead evidence to the contrary to provide the jury with a more complete picture of the 
issues in the case.  
This new capacity for the prosecution to lead evidence of the victim’s good character may in some 
cases deter particular lines of questioning by removing the unfair advantage that may arise because 
the homicide victim is not a witness in the proceeding. The potential reforms would remove any 
unfair advantage the accused may have while being consistent with the accused’s right to a fair trial. 
This paper asks whether these two potential reforms should be introduced. 
Monitoring and reviewing 
The proposals in this paper involve significant reforms. The VLRC recommended that the 
department review the operation of excessive self-defence five years after it had commenced 
operation. That recommendation fixed an appropriate time frame for reviewing such an important 
change.  
The department’s proposals (as informed by comments on this paper) should, if enacted by the 
government, also be reviewed to see if they achieve the intended outcomes. The department 
proposes that these laws should be reviewed five years after their commencement.  
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Proposals and questions 
 
Proposal 1 – Defensive homicide (Part 2) 
The department proposes that the offence of defensive homicide be abolished. 
Proposal 2 – Excessive self-defence (Part 2) 
The department proposes that excessive self-defence (in any form) should not be introduced. 
Proposal 3 – Self-defence (Part 3)  
The department proposes that the first limb of the common law test of self-defence should be 
reinstated, namely, whether the accused believed that it was necessary to do what he or she did to 
defend himself, herself or another. 
Question 1 – Self-defence (Part 3) 
Should the test for self-defence be that the accused believed that it was necessary to do what he or 
she did to defend himself, herself or another, and 
(a) had reasonable grounds for that belief (the common law test), or 
(b) the accused’s response was a reasonable response in the circumstances as perceived by 
the accused (the VLRC / NSW test)? 
Proposal 4 – A consistent test for self-defence (Part 3) 
The department proposes that the test for self-defence should be set out in the Crimes Act 1958 and 
should apply consistently to fatal and non-fatal offences. 
Proposal 5 – Abolition of the common law test for self-defence (Part 3) 
The department proposes that the common law test for self-defence be expressly abolished, 
wherever the new statutory test for self-defence applies. 
Proposal 6 – Social context evidentiary laws (Part 3) 
The department proposes that the social context evidence laws contained in section 9AH of the 
Crimes Act 1958 be extended to apply to any claim of self-defence and not be limited to where the 
offence charged is murder or manslaughter. 
Question 2 – Improper questions about homicide victims (Part 4) 
Should new evidence laws be introduced to prohibit questions in a homicide case about the 
victim (unless necessary in the interests of justice) where, if the victim was alive and giving 
evidence in court, the question would: 
 be offensive, humiliating or demeaning to the victim 
 treat the victim without respect 
 fail to respect the victim’s reputation, or 
 have no basis other than a stereotype (e.g. a stereotype based on the victim's sex, race, 
culture, ethnicity, age or mental, intellectual or physical disability)? 
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Question 3 – Evidence in rebuttal about homicide victims (Part 4) 
Should new evidence laws be introduced to provide that in a criminal proceeding for a homicide 
offence, if the accused introduces evidence to show that the victim was not a person of good 
character, either generally or in a particular respect, the prosecution: 
 may adduce evidence about the victim to show that the victim was a person of good 
character, either generally or in a particular respect, but 
 may not use the evidence to infer guilt (tendency reasoning)? 
The rules governing hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility evidence would not apply to this 
evidence. 
Proposal 7 – Review of the operation of reforms (Part 5) 
The department proposes that there be a review of the operation of reforms arising from this review 
five years after the reforms commence operation.  
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1 Introduction 
The VLRC Report on Defences to Homicide emphasised the importance to law reform of the social 
context within which homicides occur: 
Defences and/or partial defences to homicide should not be based on abstract 
philosophical principles, but should reflect the context in which homicides typically occur. 
In particular, the law should deal fairly with both men and women who kill and defences 
should be constructed in a way that takes account of the fact that they tend to kill in 
different circumstances.1 
The VLRC recommended significant changes to the law of homicide. Many of these 
recommendations were implemented in the Crimes (Homicide) Act. This Act, which commenced 
operation on 23 November 2005: 
 abolished provocation as a partial defence to murder 
 defined the law of self-defence in relation to homicide in legislation 
 recognised excessive self-defence through the creation of a new offence of defensive 
homicide, and 
 clarified the laws of evidence so that relevant evidence about family violence can be 
admitted in homicide proceedings to explain to a jury the context in which the person killed 
and social, psychological and economic factors that can affect family violence victims. 
These reforms recognised that homicide laws, and particularly self-defence, had developed in the 
context of violence by men, inappropriately partially excused men who kill women (in particular, the 
law of provocation) and failed to properly recognise women who kill in response to family violence 
(in particular, the law of self-defence). The reforms recognised that change to the law and to the 
culture of the criminal justice system was required. 
The VLRC recommended that the department review the operation of the law of excessive self-
defence, recognised in the offence of defensive homicide, five years after it had commenced 
operation.  
The department released a Discussion Paper, Defensive Homicide, on its website on 8 August 
2010. The Discussion Paper was also sent to a number of stakeholders. Nineteen written 
submissions were received, from a broad range of stakeholders, including some joint submissions. 
A list of submissions is at Appendix 1. The department also met with the LIV on 9 September 2010 
and the Coalition for Safer Communities on 15 September 2010.  
The Victorian Coalition Government was elected in November 2010. Both prior to the election and 
following the election, the Attorney-General, the Honourable Robert Clark MP, expressed concerns 
about the operation of the offence of defensive homicide. When in opposition, Mr Clark said (in the 
context of the sentence for Luke Middendorp for killing Jade Bownds): 
This law is just not working as it’s supposed to have worked and justice is not being 
served. The law is complex, it may well be confusing to juries or others and the end results 
seem totally contrary to common sense and seem to be leading to unjust outcomes.2 
The operation of defensive homicide has continued to be controversial. The Attorney-General 
asked the department to prepare proposals for possible legislation to reform the law concerning 
 
1 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) 15. See also Jenny Morgan, ‘Homicide Law 
Reform and Gender: Configuring Violence’ (2012) 45(3) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 351. 
2 Adrian Lowe, ‘New Calls for State to Overhaul Homicide Laws’, The Age (Melbourne), 20 May 2010, 6. 
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defensive homicide. This Consultation Paper sets out the department’s proposals for possible 
legislative reform and the reasons for those proposals and asks several questions. 
The submissions from stakeholders in relation to the Discussion Paper have been invaluable in 
developing the proposals and questions for reform. With some issues, this paper identifies all of the 
submissions that supported or did not support a position. With others, the issue is sufficiently 
covered by referring to one or two submissions that express similar views. This is for ease of 
reading rather than reflecting any view about the other submissions.  
1.1 Continuing public interest in the operation of homicide laws 
Since the publication of the department’s Discussion Paper in August 2010, the operation of the 
offence of defensive homicide has continued to be an issue of public concern.  
In February 2012, the Herald Sun reported research findings from Fitz-Gibbon and Pickering, 
where, following comments from judges and prosecutors about defensive homicide laws, they said 
that defensive homicide had complicated the law so much it was ‘difficult, if not impossible, to 
operate in the jury environment’.3 
The Attorney-General said that the law was not working as intended and had led to results that 
seemed ‘unjust and contrary to common sense’.4 The Herald Sun further reported that ‘[c]rime 
victims and domestic violence lobby groups have led growing calls for the abolition of the state's 
defensive homicide law’. The LIV’s spokesman, Rob Stary, who had represented both women who 
had been convicted of defensive homicide, at that time, indicated support for the law of defensive 
homicide and that both women (Karen Black and Eileen Creamer) had ‘been subjected to physical 
and psychological domestic violence over many years’.5 
Another aspect of the operation of defensive homicide arose in June 2012 when the Melbourne 
University Law Review published an article by Flynn and Fitz-Gibbon6 which set out the results of 
their examination of pleas of guilty to defensive homicide. Flynn and Fitz-Gibbon discussed issues 
concerning accountability and transparency in prosecution decision-making to accept pleas of guilty 
to defensive homicide. The lack of information concerning the reasons why the prosecution is 
accepting these pleas of guilty means that the community does not know whether offenders are 
properly being held to account for their actions, that is, whether any of these offenders should have 
been prosecuted for murder.7 
The DPP and the Chief Crown Prosecutor responded to media articles concerning these practices 
stating that the ‘necessary checks and balances are in place to govern all plea negotiations 
including homicide practices’.8 This debate led to broader observations concerning the operation of 
defensive homicide. The Age editorial discussed the importance of not losing sight of the reasons 
why reform was necessary in 2005, principally the issue of gender bias in the law, when 
undertaking the ‘basically sound decision to amend the state defensive homicide law’.9  
The importance of the context of these reforms and the context of gendered killings has also been 
considered by Tyson. Two of the most significant parts of the 2005 reforms were the abolition of 
 
3 Geoff Wilkinson and Courtney Crane, ‘A Law Meant to Protect Women is Being Abused by Brutal Men’, Herald Sun 
(Melbourne) 10 February 2012. 
4 Ibid. See also, Andrea Petrie, ‘Killers Abusing Defence Law’, The Age (Melbourne) 16 June 2013. 
5 Courtney Crane, ‘Growing Calls for Defensive Homicide Review’, Herald Sun (Melbourne) 13 February 2012.  
6 Asher Flynn and Kate Fitz-Gibbon, ‘Bargaining with Defensive Homicide: Examining Victoria’s Secretive Plea Bargaining 
System Post-Law Reform’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 927. 
7 Andrea Petrie, ‘Murder “Deals” Under Fire’, The Age (Melbourne), 25 June 2012, 1. 
8 Andrea Petrie, ‘State to Change Defensive Homicide Law’, The Age (Melbourne) 26 June 2012, 1. 
9 Editorial, ‘Defensive Homicide Warrants a Calm Review’, The Age (Melbourne) 27 June 2012, 14. 
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provocation and the improvements to self-defence in the context of family violence. As Tyson 
indicated, in response to the Herald Sun articles in February 2012 referred to above, and the 
comment that defensive homicide is replacing provocation: 
If you look at the Supreme Court cases involving men who have killed their current or ex-
partners since the abolition of provocation and the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 came into 
effect, the majority of these male killers have been sentenced on the basis of murder: 27 
male defendants have been charged with murder for killing an intimate partner or ex-
partner. Of these, 21 have been sentenced on the basis of murder; 12 were the result of a 
plea of guilty to murder and another nine were convicted of murder after a trial. There have 
only been six cases involving men who killed their intimate partner or ex-partner who have 
had their culpability reduced to manslaughter after a trial. The case of Middendorp is the 
only case involving a man who killed his ex-partner and who has been convicted of the 
offence of defensive homicide after a trial. 
1.1.1 Other Australian jurisdictions 
Examination of these kinds of laws is not limited to Victoria. The Legislative Council of the New 
South Wales Parliament established an inquiry into the law of provocation following the case of 
Singh v The Queen.10 
The accused in Singh strangled his wife before cutting her throat eight times with a box cutter. The 
Crown refused a guilty plea to manslaughter, but at trial the accused was found not guilty of 
murder, and guilty of manslaughter on the basis of the partial defence of provocation. He was 
sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment, with a six year non-parole period. The basis of the 
provocation in Singh was the accused’s wife’s desire to end their marriage, which would affect his 
Australian visa.  
An earlier New South Wales case, R v Stevens, raised similar issues.11 The prosecution accepted a 
guilty plea to manslaughter by provocation. The accused had violently beaten his partner, who died 
of abdominal bleeding. There was evidence of a history of violence by the accused against the 
victim, who was found to have over 76 separate injuries to her body, of varying ages. The most 
recent injuries were blunt trauma injuries to the head. 
In both Singh and Stevens, the defence of provocation was founded on the accused’s report of the 
victim’s inflammatory statements and conduct. In Singh, this included hearsay evidence about what 
the deceased had said immediately prior to the attack, which included reference to an infidelity not 
supported by other witnesses. In Stevens, the accused made several allegations about the victim, 
including infidelity and ‘bad mothering’. 
The New South Wales Parliamentary Committee was established in June 2012 to ‘inquire into and 
report on: the retention of the partial defence of provocation including abolishing the defence or 
amending the defence in light of proposals in other jurisdictions; the adequacy of the defence of 
self-defence for victims of prolonged domestic and sexual violence; and any other matters’. In its 
report dated April 2013, the Committee recommended (among other things) retention of the partial 
defence of provocation where a person kills in response to ‘gross provocation’.12 
In South Australia, the Honourable Tammy Franks MP introduced a Bill in May 2013 to remove 
non-violent homosexual advances from constituting provocation. Franks is currently engaging in 
public consultation regarding whether provocation should be abolished completely in that state. 
 
10 Singh v The Queen [2012] NSWSC 637. 
11 R v Stevens [2008] NSWSC 1370. 
12 New South Wales, Legislative Council, Select Committee on the Partial Defence of Provocation, The Partial Defence of 
Provocation (23 April 2013). 
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By contrast, provocation was abolished in Victoria in 2005. The changes to the law in relation to 
provocation were discussed by Justice King in her sentencing remarks in R v Neascu, where 
Neascu pleaded guilty to murdering his ex-wife’s lover: 
Our community, parliament and the courts have repeatedly said that women are not 
chattels, they are not something that is owned by a man, any man. Your wife was entitled 
to leave you. You may not have liked that, but she had the right to do so. She did not have 
to tell you where she was going, or if she was pursing a relationship with another man. You 
had no right to know this, and you had no right to control what she did, but particularly you 
had no right to kill the man with whom she had formed a relationship because of your 
anger as being, as it was described, ‘cuckolded’. Your relationship had been well and truly 
over and our society has moved forward and does not excuse any person on the basis of 
the crime being a ‘crime of passion’. Provocation has been abolished in this State, and 
rightly so.13 
However, in considering the abolition of provocation in circumstances where men kill women, cases 
like R v Middendorp14 and Sherna v The Queen15 show that it is important to be aware that: 
[t]he past should not continue to influence the present in undesirable ways and the partial 
defence [of provocation] should not re-emerge in a new guise as a particular variety of 
murder. Many of the old assumptions will need to be discarded and a new normative 
framework must be developed.16 
1.1.2 Family violence generally 
The importance of addressing family violence, and that it is a priority for Victoria Police, was 
reaffirmed by Chief Commissioner Lay shortly after he was appointed. In September 2012, The Age 
reported that: 
Across Victoria, there was a 23 per cent increase in reports to police of family violence-
related crime and a 45 per cent increase in the number of charges issued in 2011–12 
compared with the year before. 
The statistics show 50,382 reports of family violence to police resulted in 17,528 charges. 
Over the past five years, reports have increased by 59 per cent and charges by 125 per 
cent.17 
On 29 November 2012, the DPP, John Champion SC, said that: 
Family violence was involved in 378 serious criminal matters received by the Office of 
Public Prosecutions (OPP) in the past year, according to statistics gathered as part of a 
new family violence policy. 
This represented 13.9 per cent of the total number of criminal prosecution matters received 
by the OPP in the past year. 
The statistics also reveal that more than 40 per cent of family violence-related matters 
involved sexual offending, and 92 per cent of the perpetrators were male.18 
In July 2013, Chief Commissioner Lay described family violence as one of the most significant law 
and order problems in Victoria, with half of assaults in the state happening in the home.19 
 
13 R v Neascu [2012] VSCA 388 [43]. 
14 R v Middendorp [2010] VSC 202. 
15 Sherna v The Queen [2011] VSCA 242. 
16 Felicity Stewart and Arie Freiberg, ‘Provocation in Sentencing’ (Research Report, Sentencing Advisory Council, 2nd ed, July 
2009).   
17 Nicole Brady, ‘Charges for Family Violence Soar’, The Age (Melbourne) 9 September 2012. In April 2013, Chief 
Commissioner Lay estimated that approximately 64,000 family violence offences would be reported in the 2012-13 
financial year: Nino Bucci, ‘Police Chief Says Family Violence Worse Than Imagined’, The Age (Melbourne) 22 April 2013. 
18 Office of Public Prosecutions, Victoria ‘Media releases’, www.opp.vic,gov.au. 
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While this paper focuses primarily on one part of family violence, namely where it leads to a woman 
killing in response to family violence, the volume of family violence, and the very high percentage of 
perpetrators who are male, is very important in framing this analysis. 
1.1.3 Family violence in homicide cases 
A recent study examined family violence or ‘battered women’s homicides’ across Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada. Because there is no comprehensive database of all homicide cases, there 
are some limitations to the data which was derived from reported and unreported cases and media 
articles. The authors of the study, Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie (from the Universities of Ottawa, 
New South Wales and Auckland respectively) state that:  
The homicide rate in Australia is at a historically low level (1.2 per 100,000), and there has 
been a marked reduction in the rate of homicides over the past decade, especially for 
homicides by men who killed friends or acquaintance [sic]; women rarely kill in such 
circumstances. However, the trend in domestic homicides is distinctive in that unlike other 
categories of homicide, the number has not declined. In 2008–2009, the most recent year 
for which data have been reported, more than half of all Australian homicides were 
‘domestic’ (52%), that is they involved family members and/or others in a domestic 
relationship; among domestic homicides, intimate partner homicides made up the largest 
category (60%).20 
More recent data from the Australian Institute of Criminology for the financial years 2008–09 and 
2009–10 indicates that domestic homicides had fallen to 36% of all homicides and intimate partners 
make up 66% of this category. Men comprised 88% of offenders and 12% were women. Men 
comprised 68%, and women 32%, of all victims of homicide.21 
The findings of the study by Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie are set out below: 
Table 1: Homicide prosecutions of battered women 2000–2010, Australia: Outcomes by State 
 
Outcome NSW Vic QLD WA SA NT ACT Tas Aust %
Withdrawn 1        1 1.5 
Dismissed at 
committal 
 1       1 1.5 
Trials           
Acquittal (self-
defence) 
5 2 1 1 1  1  11 16.4 
Manslaughter 
conviction 
2 4 2 2 1    11 16.4 
Murder conviction     1    1 1.5 
Guilty Pleas           
Other offences    1  1*   2 3.0 
Manslaughter 15 5 7 6 1 3  2 39 58.2 
Murder 1        1 1.5 
Total 24 12 10 10 4 4 1 2 67 100 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
19 Ellen Whinnett, ‘Chief Commissioner Ken Lay Says More Men Need to Stand Up Against Domestic Violence’, The Herald 
Sun (Melbourne) 22 July 2013. 
20 Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie, ‘Battered Women Charged with Homicide in Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand: How Do They Fare?’ (2012) 45(3) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 383, 385.  
21 Australian Institute of Criminology, Homicide in Australia 2008–09 to 2009–10: National Homicide Monitoring Program 
Annual Report, Monitoring Report No 21 (2013). There is no explanation at this stage for why the percentage of ‘domestic 
homicides’ has fallen within an otherwise steady homicide rate.  
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As Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie say: 
If these figures accurately reflect what is happening in practice, murder convictions of 
battered women appear to have become rare in Australia. By comparison, Bradfield’s 
study of the period 1980–2000 found seven murder convictions (9%) and 10 acquittals 
(13%) from 76 cases (2002). This suggests that, over the past decade, greater recognition 
has been given to the context of domestic violence in cases involving battered women 
defendants for the purposes of assessing criminal liability and applying the legal defences. 
It also seems that in the majority of homicide cases involving battered women defendants, 
the prosecution accepted guilty pleas to charges less than murder – sparing the defendant, 
witnesses and society the costs involved in going to trial. In slightly less than half of these 
cases, it did so on the basis of one of the partial defences to murder.22 
In relation to Victorian cases, it should be noted that a significant number of these cases occurred 
before the 2005 reforms commenced. In one of the two murder convictions in the above table, the 
judge indicated that the case was essentially one of manslaughter and used this as a guide to 
sentencing, imposing a head sentence of nine years’ imprisonment.23 
1.2 Scope of this paper 
This paper picks up on issues raised by the department’s Discussion Paper in 2010 and issues 
which have arisen since that time. This paper focuses primarily on the operation of defensive 
homicide and the operation of self-defence in the context of family violence. It is beyond the scope 
of this paper to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the prevalence of family violence generally 
within Victoria. The ALRC and NSWLRC report, Family Violence – A National Legal Response 
(2012) contains a comprehensive review of family violence and Australian laws, including homicide 
laws, in the context of family violence.24  
It is also beyond the scope of this paper to comprehensively review offences where men kill 
women. This is because the focus of the paper is on reviewing defensive homicide. In the 28 
convictions for defensive homicide, only one has involved a man killing a woman. The focus of this 
paper does not suggest in any way that how the law applies in situations where men kill women is 
less important. While a comprehensive analysis of this situation is beyond the scope of this paper, 
a number of the proposals in this paper will also assist in addressing issues which have arisen 
where men kill women.   
1.2.1 Overview of this paper 
The Discussion Paper indicated that it was the first step in the department’s review of defensive 
homicide. Informed by submissions from that paper, further cases and commentary about the 
operation of these laws, this paper presents proposals and questions for possible legislative 
reforms. The main Parts of the paper are as follows: 
 Part 2 – contains a detailed analysis of defensive homicide from both a policy perspective and 
based on how it has operated in practice 
 Part 3 – discusses how the test for self-defence should operate, and 
 Part 4 – examines the issue of ‘victim-blaming’ and potential reforms to address this issue. 
 
22 Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie, ‘Battered Women Charged with Homicide in Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand: How Do They Fare?’ (2012) 45(3) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 383, 388.  
23 Ibid 389.  
24 The department has also published an 11 year trend analysis (1999–2010) of family violence reports in Victoria. See 
Department of Justice, Measuring Family Violence in Victoria: Victorian Family Violence Database Volume 5 (2012). 
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In examining these issues, it is essential to closely examine and comment upon recent cases. It 
would be inappropriate, and it is not the intention of this paper, to make any criticism of jury 
verdicts. Juries play a vital role in our criminal justice system. Further, it is not possible to second-
guess a jury’s factual conclusions. This paper also discusses some cases in which a decision was 
made to plead guilty to defensive homicide. These cases assist in explaining how the laws and the 
criminal justice system are working. It is not the intention of this paper to make any criticism of 
individual plea decisions.  
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2 Defensive Homicide 
2.1 Introduction 
The central question posed by the Discussion Paper was whether the offence of defensive 
homicide should be retained, limited or abolished. As outlined in the Discussion Paper, the primary 
focus of the law with regard to killing in response to family violence should be the laws of self-
defence. Following the recommendations of the VLRC, the Crimes (Homicide) Act introduced 
important changes to these laws. 
In this part, we examine more recent cases involving defensive homicide, consider whether 
defensive homicide can be simplified and examine the operation of defensive homicide where the 
accused is a woman and where the accused is a man. 
2.2 The operation of defensive homicide since August 2010 
The Discussion Paper identified that between November 2005 and August 2010, there had been 13 
defensive homicide cases. All 13 offenders were male, and 12 of the victims were male. The 
majority of the cases involved a one-off violent confrontation between males, rather than a family 
violence or intimate partner context. The one notable exception arose in Middendorp’s case. 
Since 2010, there have been a further 15 defensive homicide convictions, three of which involved 
female offenders killing an intimate partner. A summary of the cases over these two time periods is 
set out in Appendices 2 and 3 respectively. 
The additional three years of operation of defensive homicide have confirmed the conclusion 
reached in the Discussion Paper that most of ‘these cases have involved one-off, violent 
confrontations between males of approximately equal strength’.25 
Including the additional cases means that since the commencement of defensive homicide: 
 the overwhelming majority of offenders were men (25 out of 28) 
 the overwhelming majority of victims were men (26 out of 27) 
 the overwhelming majority of men killed another man (24 out of 25) 
 all three female offenders killed a man (3 out of 3) 
 a minority of offenders had a family relationship with the victim (7 out of 28) 
 a majority of the family relationships involved intimate partners (4 out of 7) 
 a majority of the intimate partner killings were by women (3 out of 4) 
 the overwhelming majority of male offenders had prior convictions (19 out of 23)26   
 only one female offender had prior convictions (1 out of 3) 
 a weapon was used in every offence (17 involved a knife, 2 involved a tomahawk, 3 
involved a firearm and 6 involved some other blunt instrument)  
 the majority of offenders pleaded guilty (19 out of 28), and 
 the majority of female offenders pleaded guilty (2 out of 3).  
 
25 Department of Justice, Defensive Homicide: Discussion Paper (2010) 5. 
26 At the time of publication of this Consultation Paper, the reasons for sentence in the case involving the 13 year old offender 
(whose name is unknown) had not yet been published. Accordingly, it is not known whether the accused had any prior 
convictions. 
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This data helps to explain how the offence of defensive homicide is being used. Given that 
there were three female offenders, each of these cases warrants detailed discussion. 
2.2.1 R v Black [2011] VSC 152 
In October 2009, Karen Black had an ‘extended argument’ with her de facto husband, Wayne 
Clarke. The argument moved to the kitchen, where Mr Clarke pinned Ms Black into a corner by 
sticking his chest out and jabbing her body with his finger. Ms Black said that Mr Clarke was a lot 
taller than her. Ms Black grabbed a kitchen knife, Mr Clarke continued to corner her and ‘egg her 
on’, and she stabbed him twice in the chest. Ms Black surrendered herself to police soon after the 
stabbing and expressed immediate remorse for her actions. 
The Crown charged Ms Black with murder but accepted her plea to defensive homicide. The Crown 
did not dispute that there had been a long history of family violence on the part of Mr Clarke 
towards Ms Black. There was evidence of frequent drunken verbal abuse and physical intimidation, 
unwanted sexual contact and bruises on Ms Black.  
In relation to the killing, Ms Black said, ‘[h]e was then coming closer and closer to me and was 
pointing his finger at me, and I was thinking because he was so drunk he would probably want to 
force himself on me sexually and I was just thinking well what else could he do to me’.  
The trial judge found Ms Black’s offending to be in the middle of the range for defensive homicide, 
and sentenced Ms Black to nine years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of six years.   
2.2.2 R v Creamer [2011] VSC 196 
On the known facts, on 3 February 2008, Eileen Creamer struck her husband, David Creamer, with 
a blunt weapon on a number of occasions, both inside and outside their home, and stabbed him in 
the abdomen with a kitchen knife. Mr Creamer received a very severe beating and would have 
been disabled at the time he was stabbed.  
These facts differ markedly from Ms Creamer’s account. Ms Creamer gave evidence of her belief 
that Mr Creamer was arranging for her to have sex with other men in his presence, and that she 
had seen him meet with two men for that purpose on 2 February. After an argument later that day, 
she said that she awoke to find Mr Creamer hitting her with a stick. The next day, Ms Creamer 
believed that Mr Creamer was going to attack her, and started hitting him with the stick that he had 
hit her with the day before. He was verbally abusing her, she ran out of the house, he dragged her 
back in and grabbed a kitchen knife. The struggle continued on the bed, where Mr Creamer said 
that he was going to ‘finish her off’ and then she stabbed Mr Creamer. Ms Creamer then said that 
when she ran out of the house to dispose of the stick, he followed her out and called for her to 
come back. When she returned to the house, she heard Mr Creamer in the shower. Ms Creamer 
then said that she found her husband dead the next morning.  
Mr and Mrs Creamer had been married for 10 years. Their marriage was characterised by 
prolonged periods apart and extra marital affairs on both sides. In April 2006, Mr Creamer moved to 
Australia from New Zealand, with Ms Creamer following him at his request in May 2007. Ms 
Creamer indicated that throughout their marriage, Mr Creamer repeatedly pressured her to take 
part in group sex, which she refused to do. Ms Creamer also gave evidence that Mr Creamer was 
physically abusive, and forced her to have sex with him. 
Ms Creamer was charged with murder. The Crown submitted that Ms Creamer murdered her 
husband when she became aware that he had reconciled with his first wife, and intended to end 
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their marriage. Ms Creamer offered to plead guilty to defensive homicide but the trial proceeded on 
the murder charge. The jury acquitted her of murder but convicted her of defensive homicide. 
The trial judge queried some aspects of Ms Creamer’s evidence, such as the alleged beating on 2 
February, and did not accept several other aspects. For example, the trial judge did not accept that 
on 3 February, Mr Creamer had threatened to ‘finish her off’,27 or that Mr Creamer would have been 
able to leave the house or have a shower after Ms Creamer stabbed him. 
The trial judge also did not accept all the matters raised about family violence on Ms Creamer’s 
behalf but noted that the jury must have regarded the family violence as real in order to reach its 
verdict. The trial judge sentenced Ms Creamer on the basis that she had been overwhelmed by the 
whole of the circumstances as they surrounded her, and in particular, by her concern that she was 
being forced into a sexual scenario that she did not want. 
The trial judge noted that the objective circumstances of the case made it a serious example of 
defensive homicide.  The judge indicated at [29] that Ms Creamer had inflicted ‘a very severe 
beating, demonstrating that [she] was out of control’, and sentenced Ms Creamer to 11 years’ 
imprisonment, with a non-parole period of seven years. This is the second highest sentence 
imposed for defensive homicide (the highest being the 12 year sentence imposed in Middendorp’s 
case28). Two other cases since 2010 also involved head sentences of 11 years’ imprisonment.29    
Ms Creamer appealed the sentence on the basis that it was manifestly excessive.30 The appeal 
was dismissed. Weinberg JA (with whom Bongiorno JA and T Forrest AJA agreed) said at [48] that 
‘the sentencing judge was entitled to characterise this as a serious example of defensive homici
Insofar as it fell outside the parameters of murder, it did so only by a narrow margin’. In discussing 
the requirement for an offender to believe that they were under threat of death or really serious 
injury, Weinberg JA went on to say at [50] that:  
There are degrees by which a belief may be said that have been unreasonable. In some 
cases, the line is just barely crossed. In others, the belief is wholly unjustifiable, almost to 
the point of being fanciful. The present case strikes me as falling within the latter category.  
2.2.3 R v Edwards [2012] VSC 138 
In January 2011, Jemma Edwards stabbed her husband, James Edwards, more than 30 times in 
the upper body, right arm and left leg. Ms Edwards initially told police that Mr Edwards had been 
killed by two offenders. She was assessed as unfit to be interviewed and detained in a psychiatric 
unit for 13 days.  
After her release, she confessed to killing Mr Edwards, but told police that she had acted in self-
defence. Ms Edwards told police of a history of violence by Mr Edwards towards her and said that 
the night before the killing, Mr Edwards had been drinking heavily and had threatened her 
repeatedly. Ms Edwards said that on the day of the killing, Mr Edwards was still drunk. He punched 
her, and threatened to kill her, cut her eyes out and her ears off. She shot him with a spear gun. 
The spear bounced off him, and he came towards her with a kitchen knife. There was a struggle in 
which Mr Edwards fell, at which time she grabbed the knife and stabbed him. The trial judge 
expressed serious reservations about the account given by Ms Edwards and noted that some 
aspects of it were incompatible with the forensic and other evidence at the scene.  
 
27 Justice Coghlan said that the first time Mrs Creamer had said this was during the trial and he was not prepared to find that 
it was said: see R v Creamer [2011] VSC 196 [21]. 
28 An appeal against sentence was dismissed in Middendorp v The Queen [2012] VSCA 47. 
29 R v Svetina [2011] VSC 392 and DPP v McEwan [2012] VSC 417.  See Appendix 3 for a brief summary. 
30 Creamer v The Queen [2012] VSCA 182. 
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Ms Edwards was charged with murder and pleaded guilty to defensive homicide. 
Ms Edwards had a prior conviction for assault occasioning actual bodily harm following an incident 
in 2005 in which she stabbed Mr Edwards four times with a corkscrew/knife. Ms Edwards had no 
visible injuries but claimed that she acted in self-defence after her husband had punched her 
repeatedly for 30 minutes and threatened to kill her. 
Ms Edwards had a significant history of psychiatric illness, involving anxiety and bipolar disorder, 
but her counsel did not submit that her mental state at the time of the killing would require a 
consideration of the principles set out in R v Verdins.31    
The trial judge found that Ms Edwards had suffered domestic violence at the hands of Mr Edwards 
on numerous occasions over the preceding 12 years, and that he had also been violent towards his 
mother and his daughter. At the time of his death, there was an intervention order protecting Ms 
Edwards from her husband.  
The Crown acknowledged, and the trial judge agreed, that Ms Edwards’ culpability was less than 
that of the offender in Black’s case, discussed above.  The trial judge sentenced Ms Edwards to 
seven years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of four years and nine months.  
2.3 Should defensive homicide be limited to situations involving 
serious family violence? 
As discussed in the Discussion Paper, defensive homicide could either be retained, limited in some 
way (e.g. to situations involving family violence) or abolished.  
There was little support for limiting defensive homicide to situations involving serious family 
violence. Victoria Police and the Crime Victims Support Association supported further consideration 
of this approach. However, this option was strongly criticised in many submissions (e.g. LIV, VLA, 
the former DPP, the joint submission by Tyson, Capper and Kirkwood, and the Union of Australian 
Women).  
This opposition was both philosophical and practical. First, it was submitted that it is inappropriate 
for the law to apply in such an unequal manner where people who have the same state of mind are 
partially excused in one situation and not excused in another. The LIV said the following: 
The LIV submits that fundamental objective of the Criminal Law [sic] is to establish a 
standard of conduct based on community values and expectations that ordinary men and 
women are to observe. For this purpose, the criminal law must be stated in a clear fashion, 
and must apply equally to all people. 
Secondly, concerns were raised that it would be inappropriate to limit this offence to either: 
 women, and thereby exclude children from raising it, or 
 family violence, but not apply it to other situations where there are power imbalances and 
trusting relationships (e.g. carer relationships for the elderly or mentally impaired).  
A number of submissions agreed with the criticism identified in the Discussion Paper that by limiting 
the application of defensive homicide to family violence, the law would treat those who act in 
excessive self-defence differently, depending on the reasons why, and the circumstances in which, 
they kill. If the law operates to excuse or partially excuse a person from criminal responsibility for a 
serious criminal offence, the law should apply equally to people who have the same state of mind. It 
 
31 R v Verdins (2007) 16 VR 269. 
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should not apply differently to other people who are also vulnerable in some way and kill the person 
abusing them.  
Tyson, Capper and Kirkwood also indicate that limiting the defence to family violence would risk 
discouraging women who kill in response to family violence from going to trial and relying on self-
defence for a complete acquittal. If the offence is only used for family violence cases, it may be 
mislabelled as ‘the family violence defence’. As discussed later in this part, defensive homicide 
itself may distort defences and detract from a claim of full self-defence. There is a much greater risk 
of distortion of defences and this takes away from what should be the primary focus, namely the 
complete defence of self-defence.   
In addition to the VLRC, the Law Reform Commission of Western Australia32 and the New Zealand 
Law Commission33 did not support the introduction of a specific defence for use in the context of 
family violence.  
The department agrees with the views expressed in a number of submissions that defensive 
homicide should not be limited to killings in response to family violence.  
These arguments focus on formal or procedural equality.34 The challenge with self-defence is 
providing substantive equality in the manner in which self-defence operates for women who kill. 
The basis on which self-defence developed recognised that men may kill in self-defence where 
there is an immediate threat from another man of similar strength. The operation of self-defence 
therefore needs to be challenged to ensure that it similarly recognises the different situations in 
which women kill, which is often in response to family violence where the threat may not be 
immediate and the woman and man are not of similar strength.  
2.4 Submissions concerning abolition or retention of defensive 
homicide 
There are essentially two options to consider in detail: 
 retaining defensive homicide and reviewing its operation again in a further two, three or five 
years, or 
 abolishing defensive homicide. 
In deciding between these two options, a range of issues and different perspectives need to be 
considered. 
Submissions were mixed on whether defensive homicide should be retained or abolished. Most of 
the submissions that supported abolition of the offence expressed that view strongly. Many of the 
submissions supporting retention of the offence were more equivocal, with a number advocating a 
further review in two, three or five years time. In some instances, this qualification was because of 
the small number of cases up to August 2010. In other instances, it was because of concerns about 
how it was operating in practice (i.e. the cases in which men were convicted of defensive 
homicide).  
Tyson, Capper and Kirkwood ‘cautiously’ recommended the retention of the offence on the basis 
that it was too early to know whether the ‘safety-net’ is necessary. Their submission acknowledges 
 
32 Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, A Review of the Law of Homicide, Project No 94 (2007) 289. 
33 New Zealand Law Commission, Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants, Report No 73 
(2001) 29–30. 
34 For a discussion of why formal equality seems to have prevailed over substantive equality in Australia, see Reg Graycar 
and Jenny Morgan, ‘Feminist Legal Theory and Understandings of Equality: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?’ 
(2005) 28 Thomas Jefferson Law Review 399. 
                                  Defensive Homicide 
 
                                                    13 
   
 
e. 
                                                
problems with the offence, including that it allows men to use similar arguments in relation to their 
behaviour that occurred with provocation, and implying that it is not reasonable for a woman to kill a 
violent partner (particularly where there is no immediate assault).  
Legal stakeholders such as Victoria Police, the former DPP and VLA, recommended retaining the 
offence on the basis that it fills a gap in the law.35 The former DPP and Victoria Police specifically 
recommended a further review of the offence in three or three to five years time, respectively.  
VLA wrote that it is ‘important and appropriate that the law recognise that there are cases of 
homicide which involve a lower degree of moral culpability than murder, while not satisfying all of 
the criteria for self-defence’. VLA indicated that more time may be required to assess whether a 
separate offence is warranted. 
The majority of victims groups submitted that the offence should be abolished, as did some family 
violence stakeholders. A recurring theme was that in practice, the offence has not been used as it 
was intended to be used. For example, People Against Lenient Sentencing wrote that ‘although it 
may have had the right intentions when put into place … (it is) used as a bartering tool to get a 
lesser sentence for what is fundamentally a murder charge’. 
Fitz-Gibbon has expressed concern that the existence of the offence suggests that killing in 
response to family violence is not ‘reasonable’: 
In relation to providing a safety net for battered women who kill…defensive homicide is not 
the appropriate categorisation for this type of killing as it would suggest that the offender 
did not have reasonable grounds for believing that they were defending themselves or 
another from death or really serious injury … A conviction of defensive homicide in these 
circumstances sends a problematic message to the community that the actions of such 
persons were not reasonable. 
Many of the submissions supporting abolition, including those from Ashton, Howe and the joint 
submission by Pickering, Maher and Segrave, consider that the focus of law reform in this area 
should be on the availability of self-defence. 
2.5 Defensive homicide and complexity 
The Discussion Paper considered whether the complexity in defensive homicide meant that, for that 
reason alone, it should be abolished. This included a discussion of the history of excessive self-
defence as developed by the common law, which was overturned by the High Court in 1987, in 
Zecevic v DPP, because of its complexity.36  
This issue was discussed in a number of submissions and has been the subject of considerable 
discussion in academic journals and elsewhere. 
2.5.1 Is defensive homicide complex? 
After the Discussion Paper was released, the Court of Appeal considered the application of the law 
of defensive homicide in the case of Babic v The Queen.37 Babic appealed against his conviction 
for murder and raised issues concerning the trial judge’s directions about defensive homicid
 
35 The ‘gap’ is not expressly identified, but probably concerns the fact that manslaughter does not apply where a person 
intends to kill or cause really serious injury to another person. 
36 Zecevic v DPP (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645. 
37 Babic v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 297. 
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The Court of Appeal identified a further level of complexity with the operation of the laws of 
defensive homicide. 
The further complexity arises at the stage of the second test. The second test operates from the 
premise that the jury has reached the conclusion (at the first stage) that the accused did believe it 
was necessary to act in self-defence. However, the jury may be of the view that the prosecution has 
not proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused held this view (i.e. it is possible that the 
accused believed it was necessary to act in self-defence) rather than having reached a positive 
conclusion that the accused did or did not hold that belief. 
Where the jury is in doubt about the accused’s belief, the jury must acquit the accused of murder 
and then consider whether there were reasonable grounds for the accused’s belief. This is a very 
difficult intellectual task to perform when the jury has uncertainty about what belief the accused 
actually did hold. It is also necessarily complex for the judge to direct the jury about such matters.  
In Babic v The Queen, Justices Neave and Harper sought to assist judges with the direction for 
defensive homicide and indicated that the direction ‘would not need to be excessively complex’:  
You may find that the accused believed it was necessary to do what they did to defend 
him/herself or another person from death or really serious injury. If so you must acquit the 
accused of murder and go on to consider whether he/she is guilty of defensive homicide.  
Or you may find the accused not guilty of murder because the prosecution has not proved 
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not believe it was necessary to do what 
he/she did to defend him/herself or another person from death or really serious injury. 
There again you must go on to consider whether he/she is guilty of defensive homicide.  
He/she will be guilty of that crime only if the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt 
that the accused had no reasonable grounds for having the belief which you either found 
he/she held or alternatively which he/she said they held and the prosecution did not 
disprove. In that second case you should assume, when considering whether the 
prosecution has proved the accused is guilty of defensive homicide, that the accused did 
hold the asserted belief.38 
2.5.2 Is complexity a problem? 
The LIV considered the direction in Babic’s case in its submission: 
The LIV disagrees with the Court of Appeal’s assessment that this direction ‘need not be 
excessively complex’. We forcefully submit that this direction is extremely complex and is 
difficult to understand for jurors, lawyers and laypeople alike.  
The risk, we submit, is that a juror, when faced with this complex direction, may come to 
an anomalous result. 
The further explanation in Babic’s case is necessarily complex and will be challenging for a jury to 
understand and apply. Further, while it is necessary to make the test work, it involves the jury 
working from a fictional proposition. If the jury finds that the prosecution has ‘not disproved’ that the 
accused believed it was necessary to act in self-defence (but is not satisfied that the accused did 
believe this), in deciding whether the accused had reasonable grounds, the jury must act on the 
basis (‘assume’) that the accused did have that belief. 
In a survey of Supreme Court and County Court judges, most judges considered that jury directions 
(which include the judge’s explanation of the relevant laws the jury must apply) have become 
 
38 Babic v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 297, [95]. 
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‘increasingly more complex, creating an “over-intellectualisation” of criminal law’.39 The judges saw 
the complexity of the law as ‘a major impediment to effective communication with the jury’.40 These 
comments could readily apply to defensive homicide. 
In addition to the submissions provided to the department, comments about the complexity of 
defensive homicide have been made in other places.  
Justice Weinberg discussed defensive homicide at the 2011 Peter Brett Memorial Lecture:  
A colleague of mine who sits in the trial division of the Supreme Court, and who was 
recently obliged to direct a jury in accordance with the new statutory self-defence 
provisions, told me that, in his opinion, even the indescribably complicated Viro formulation 
of self-defence seemed to be much easier to apply than the current law. His lament spoke 
volumes.41 
In 2010, Fitz-Gibbon and Pickering conducted research on defensive homicide by conducting 
interviews with members of the judiciary, prosecution and defence counsel concerning their 
experience with defensive homicide. A member of the judiciary said the following: 
Our experience as judges is that there are lots of problems and that maybe we haven’t got 
the solution to the problem. I don’t think we are making it worse but it is very complicated, 
very, very complicated.42 
Fitz-Gibbon and Pickering went on to say: 
The juror directions under the new legislation were also described by prosecutorial 
respondents as ‘mind-boggling’ and ‘unbelievably convoluted’, and by judicial respondents 
as ‘incomprehensible’, ‘too complex’ and ‘very complicated’.43 
In addition to these observations concerning the complexity of defensive homicide, these directions 
must be considered in the context of the other directions that the trial judge must give to a jury. The 
many complexities of jury directions in Victoria have been discussed in a number of reports.44 The 
Victorian Coalition Government has introduced the Jury Directions Act 2013 to address the 
complexities of jury directions. The Attorney-General said in his second reading speech that:    
In recent years, there has been a substantial increase in the number and complexity of the 
directions given to juries. Directions have been described as inordinately long, in a sorry 
state, over-intellectualised, complex, voluminous, uncertain and excessive. The 
government made an election commitment to reduce the complexity of jury directions, and 
this Bill is a major part of delivering on that commitment.45   
A further problem may arise because the more complex the law is and the more alternatives that 
are available to juries, the more difficult it is for juries to reach a verdict of guilty of murder. 
Complexity can obfuscate the issues in a case.  In a typical murder trial in which self-defence is 
raised, the jury will need to consider: 
 the elements of the offence of murder 
 the elements of self-defence 
 
39 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Jury Directions: Final Report (2009) 30 [2.35], citing Elizabeth Najdovski-Terziovski, 
Jonathan Clough and James R P Ogloff, ‘In Your Own Words: A Survey of Judicial Attitudes to Jury Communication’ 
(2008) 18 Journal of Judicial Administration 65, 80. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Justice Mark Weinberg, ‘The Criminal Law – A “Mildly Vituperative” Critique’ (2012) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 
1177, 1182. 
42 Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Sharon Pickering, ‘Homicide Law Reform in Victoria, Australia: From Provocation to Defensive 
Homicide and Beyond’ (2012) 52 British Journal of Criminology 158, 167. 
43 Ibid 168. 
44 For example, see  the VLRC’s Report on Jury Directions (2009), Justice Weinberg’s report, the Simplification of Jury 
Directions Project (2012), and the department’s report, Jury Directions: A New Approach (2012). 
45 Victoria, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 13 December 2012, 5556 (Robert Clark, Attorney-General). This 
Bill received Royal Assent on 12 March 2013. 
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 the elements of defensive homicide, and 
 the elements of the offence of manslaughter. 
The differences between the issues to be determined in relation to each offence and defence make 
the tasks of jurors particularly challenging. The VLRC acknowledged that with the introduction of 
excessive self-defence, ‘[w]here there is disagreement among jurors as to whether to acquit on the 
basis of self-defence, there is an added danger of compromise verdicts’.46 A compromise verdict 
may result in a conviction for defensive homicide rather than murder. However, there is a lack of 
empirical data to indicate whether this is an issue and, if it is, the extent of the issue.  
The complexity of defensive homicide also increases the risk of errors in directions by the trial 
judge. In turn, this increases the risk that the Court of Appeal will set aside a conviction and order a 
new trial. New trials take a heavy toll on the family members of the homicide victim and the 
accused and reduce community confidence in the criminal justice system. These considerations do 
not lead to the conclusion that all laws should be simple and appeal proof. However, it does mean 
that there need to be strong arguments in support of complex laws if the laws increase the risk of 
mistakes and retrials and require juries to make more fine-grained determinations of culpability.  
As Justice Weinberg has said: 
The doctrine of self-defence should never have been made so difficult to follow. That 
defence is, after all, perhaps the oldest, and most basic, of all excuses in the criminal law. 
It should be possible to explain its operation to a jury in just a few short sentences. In 
Zecevic, the High Court showed that this could be done.47 
2.5.3 Support for excessive self-defence 
As discussed above, defensive homicide was introduced in Victoria following the VLRC’s 
recommendation to introduce the partial defence of excessive self-defence. The VLRC’s 
recommendation was based on its view that: 
people who kill another person, genuinely believing their life is in danger, but who are 
unable to demonstrate the objective reasonableness of their actions, are deserving of a 
partial defence. In this case, the person intends to do something which is lawful, and is 
therefore in a very different position from someone who intends to kill unlawfully and 
intentionally due to provocation or a mental condition. This person’s lower level of 
culpability, we believe, should be recognised in the crime for which he or she is 
convicted.48 
Excessive self-defence was first recognised in 1958 by the High Court in Howe v The Queen.49 
However, excessive self-defence was abolished by the Privy Council in 1971 in Palmer v The 
Queen.50 The High Court considered this issue again in 1978, overturning the Privy Council’s 
decision and reinstating excessive self-defence in Viro v The Queen.51 However, the High Court 
reconsidered its decision in Viro’s case in 1987. In Zecevic’s case, the High Court abolished 
excessive self-defence. This chequered history of excessive self-defence is limited to the common 
law states of Australia (Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia) and when it has applied, it 
has been limited to the offence of murder. Excessive self-defence has never applied in the code 
states of Australia (Queensland, Western Australia and Tasmania).   
 
46 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) 102−3 [3.109]. 
47 Justice Mark Weinberg, ‘The Criminal Law – A “Mildly Vituperative” Critique’ (2012) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 
1177, 1183.  
48 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) xxii. 
49 Howe v The Queen  (1958) 100 CLR 448. 
50 Palmer v The Queen [1971] AC 814. 
51 Viro v The Queen  (1978) 141 CLR 88. 
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Yeo has identified considerable support for excessive self-defence from both a conceptual and 
policy perspective from High Court judges going back many decades in Australia.52 These ideas 
were reflected in the VLRC’s recommendation to introduce excessive self-defence, and in 
explaining why it is conceptually different from provocation: 
In recommending a partial excuse of excessive self-defence we wish to recognise that the 
circumstances of those who honestly believe that their actions are necessary to defend 
themselves but overstep the mark are qualitatively different from circumstances giving rise 
to issues of provocation or diminished responsibility.53 
The principle of ‘fair labelling’ may also support murder being reduced to manslaughter on the basis 
of excessive self-defence. While fair labelling may serve a number of functions, in this context its 
most important functions would be to: 
 act as a check on sentencing discretion, in particular by reducing the maximum penalty (to 
that which applies to the offence of manslaughter), and 
 ‘symbolise the degree of condemnation that should be attributed to the offender and 
signals to society how that particular offender should be regarded’.54    
It is also important to remember that for much of the history of excessive self-defence, it operated 
as a partial defence to murder in the context that murder carried either a mandatory death penalty 
or a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. Excessive self-defence provided a mechanism for 
avoiding such penalties.  
While life imprisonment is the maximum penalty that may be imposed in Victoria for the offence of 
murder, it is not a mandatory sentence. Given the discretion in sentencing, from a sentencing 
perspective, the case for recognising excessive self-defence for the offence of murder but not any 
other offence, including attempted murder, is not persuasive. However, fair labelling remains an 
important consideration. Accordingly, it is worth exploring whether the practical issues with 
excessive self-defence can be addressed so that it is not overly complex.    
2.5.4 Can excessive self-defence be simplified?   
As indicated in the Discussion Paper, at common law, for a long time the courts grappled with 
whether the law should recognise excessive self-defence. In Viro’s case, the High Court set out 
how the law of excessive self-defence should operate and how a trial judge should direct the jury 
about this law.55 As the VLRC observed about this case: 
The defence involved the jury being instructed about a complicated six-stage test, filled 
with difficult language and double negatives. Such a test was seen to be unnecessarily 
complex when weighed against the advantages of retaining the defence. It was also felt 
that if the jury believe there are reasonable grounds for the belief in the necessity to use 
the level of force used, or are in reasonable doubt about this issue, the accused would 
meet the test for self-defence. The possibility that this might result in a conviction for 
murder of a person lacking the moral culpability for murder was suggested by the majority 
of the High Court (in Zecevic) to be ‘unlikely in practice’.56  
 
52 Stanley Yeo, ‘Revisiting Excessive Self-Defence’ (2000−2001) 12 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 39. 
53 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) 101. 
54 James Chalmers and Fiona Leverick, ‘Fair Labelling in Criminal Law’ (2008) 71 Modern Law Review 217, 226. The authors 
suggest that fair labelling may be either less important or important for different reasons when applied to a defence rather 
than an offence. For present purposes, and given that excessive self-defence results in a change of classification of an 
offence (from murder to manslaughter or defensive homicide) rather than full exculpation, any such differences are likely to 
be less important in the context of this partial excuse.  
55 Viro v The Queen (1978) 141 CLR 88. 
56 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) 92 [3.89]. See also Justice Mark Weinberg, ‘The 
Criminal Law – A “Mildly Vituperative” Critique’ (2012) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 1177, 1181 who described Viro’s 
case as a ‘disaster for the administration of criminal justice. The directions it required be given to the jury in relation to self-
defence were expressed in language that was confusing at best, and incomprehensible at worst’. 
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The complexities of the High Court’s approach to excessive self-defence led the High Court to 
revisit this decision in Zecevic’s case. After this case in 1987, and before the introduction of 
defensive homicide in 2005, excessive self-defence was not recognised as a partial excuse to 
murder. The issue was simply whether the general common law test of self-defence applied. 
In addition to recommending that provocation be abolished, the Model Criminal Code Officers 
Committee (MCCOC) said in its 1998 Discussion Paper on Fatal Offences: 
On balance, the Committee is not in favour of re-introducing excessive self-defence, 
particularly in the context of abolishing provocation. As a concept, excessive self-defence 
is inherently vague. This aspect has to date resulted in no satisfactory test being 
promulgated.57 
Further, self-defence does not turn on very fine distinctions. As the High Court said in Zecevic’s 
case: 
It will often be desirable to remind the jury that in the context of self-defence it should 
approach its task in a practical manner and without undue nicety, giving proper weight to 
the predicament of the accused which may have afforded little, if any, opportunity for calm 
deliberation or detached reflection.58  
It is also important to remember that the prosecution bears the onus of proof and must prove 
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused did not believe it was necessary to act or that the 
accused did not believe on reasonable grounds that it was necessary to act as he or she did.  
If self-defence does not turn on fine distinctions, this makes it even more difficult for excessive self-
defence to operate as it depends upon a jury being able to draw reasonably fine distinctions about 
another person’s mental state.  
The VLRC’s recommendations 
The VLRC Report recommended that the partial defence of excessive self-defence should apply 
where: 
 the conduct (using lethal force) is not a reasonable response in the circumstances as the 
person perceives them, but 
 the person believes the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another 
person, or to prevent or terminate the unlawful deprivation of liberty of any person. 
The VLRC’s recommendation focused on the reasonableness of the accused’s response. In 
contrast, defensive homicide in section 9AD of the Crimes Act 1958 focuses on the reasonableness 
of the grounds for the accused’s belief that his or her conduct was necessary in self-defence. 
Excessive self-defence in New South Wales 
New South Wales introduced excessive self-defence in 2002. The test in New South Wales is very 
similar to that recommended by the VLRC and requires an assessment of whether the conduct of 
the accused was a ‘reasonable response’ in the circumstances as perceived by the accused. 
The New South Wales version does not include a specific or additional element concerning 
proportionality. The direction to the jury also avoids explaining the complexity of the distinction 
 
57 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Model Criminal Code Chapter 
5: Fatal Offences Against the Person, Discussion Paper (1998) 113. 
58  Zecevic v DPP (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645, 662–3. See also Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest of the Privy Council who said in 
Palmer v The Queen [1971] AC 814 at 832, that if a person needs to act in self-defence, ‘it will be recognised that a person 
defending himself cannot weigh to a nicety the exact measure of defensive action’. 
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between self-defence and excessive self-defence by glossing over it. The trial judge will give 
directions about both self-defence and excessive self-defence. Accordingly, the jury is directed that: 
 if the prosecution proves either that the accused did not believe it was necessary to act in 
self-defence or the accused’s response was not a reasonable response, then self-defence 
does not apply (and the accused is guilty of murder), and  
 if the prosecution proves that the accused did not believe it was necessary to act in self-
defence but does not prove that the accused’s response was not a reasonable response, 
then excessive self-defence applies (and the accused is guilty of manslaughter).   
Excessive self-defence in South Australia 
South Australia introduced a statutory form of excessive self-defence in 1991 and revised it in 
1997. Murder is reduced to manslaughter if the accused believed his or her conduct to be 
‘necessary and reasonable for a defensive purpose’, but the conduct was not ‘reasonably 
proportionate’ to the threat the accused believed existed. 
The concept of ‘proportionality’ links self-defence to the notion of self-defence as a fight between 
two men of relatively equal strength and is a purely objective test. Yeo contends that this 
proportionality test is likely to be easier for juries to use because it is a fully objective test. 
Therefore, Yeo supports its use, despite the ‘theoretical superiority’ of the VLRC / NSW type tests.59 
However, a fully objective proportionality test may struggle to properly recognise the dynamics of 
family violence.  
The VLRC observed that circumstances of family violence generally do not involve two equally 
powerful people in a one-off confrontation. It said that when women do fight back on ‘equal terms’ 
in the context of a confrontation, it is likely that most will be overpowered and may face increased 
violence as a result. In such situations, the use of a weapon against an unarmed man, while strictly 
speaking ‘disproportionate’ to the threat posed by him, may be reasonable. Similarly, in non-
confrontational cases, attacking a man who is sleeping or has his back turned may appear 
excessive, but may be the only reasonable way for a victim of family violence to protect herself. 
Former Justice of the Supreme Court of South Australia, Kevin Duggan, has discussed the 
complexity of the South Australian laws. In a murder trial, then Justice Duggan gave the jury a nine 
page handout summarising the elements of self-defence. He described the application of the law in 
some cases as ‘frighteningly complex’ and indicated that the law of self-defence in South Australia 
needed to be reformed.60    
For these reasons (among others), the VLRC rejected the South Australian test and instead 
recommended a test based on the ‘reasonableness’ of the accused’s response in the 
circumstances as perceived by the accused. However, these directions remain complex. 
2.5.5 Is there any other way of structuring excessive self-defence? 
The following proposal seeks to incorporate the VLRC’s test of excessive self-defence, based on 
whether the accused’s response was a reasonable response.61 
 
59 Stanley Yeo, ‘Revisiting Excessive Self-Defence’ (2000−2001) 12 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 39, 49. 
60 ‘Justice Kevin Duggan’, Law Report, ABC Radio National (Australia), 2 August 2011. 
61 Whether or not self-defence should include a test of whether the accused’s conduct was a reasonable response or was 
based on reasonable grounds is discussed in Part 3. 
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Defence to murder (self-defence) 
(1) Subject to sub-section (2), a person (A) is not guilty of the offence of murder if: 
(a) A believes that his or her conduct is necessary to defend himself or 
herself or another person; and 
(b) A’s conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as A 
perceives them. 
(2) If the prosecution: 
(a) does not prove that A did not believe that his or her conduct was 
necessary to defend himself or herself or another person; and 
(b) does prove that A’s conduct was not a reasonable response in the 
circumstances as A perceived them, 
then A is guilty of manslaughter by excessive self-defence and liable to level 3 
imprisonment (20 years maximum). 
This approach leads to the following outcomes: 
 If the prosecution proves that A did not believe that it was necessary to act in self-defence, 
then self-defence fails and A is guilty of murder. 
 If the prosecution does not prove that A did not believe that it was necessary to act in self-
defence (or the jury considers that there is a reasonable possibility that A did believe it was 
necessary to act in self-defence), but does prove that A’s conduct was not a reasonable 
response in the circumstances, then A is guilty of manslaughter by excessive self-defence. 
 If the prosecution does not prove that A did not believe that it was necessary to act in self-
defence, and does not prove that A’s conduct was not a reasonable response in the 
circumstances (or there is a reasonable possibility that A’s conduct was a reasonable 
response in the circumstances), then A is not guilty of murder or of manslaughter by 
excessive self-defence. 
This approach is similar to defensive homicide in that it turns self-defence to murder into a two-step 
process for the jury. The first step requires consideration of whether the accused believed it was 
necessary to do what he or she did for a defensive purpose (this step involves no question of 
reasonableness). The second step requires the jury to consider whether the ‘response’ of the 
accused was reasonable. 
However, the above approach differs from defensive homicide in the following ways: 
 it does not create a separate offence of ‘manslaughter by excessive self-defence’, unlike 
defensive homicide which is a separate offence (therefore no issue arises as to whether 
this offence can be attempted) 
 it refers to the reasonableness of the ‘response’ in the circumstances as perceived by the 
accused in contrast to defensive homicide which refers to the existence of reasonable 
grounds for the belief in the need to act in self-defence, and 
 by setting out what the prosecution must prove, it is a clearer approach to excessive self-
defence. 
This approach is also similar to the approach outlined by Justice Deane in his dissent in Zecevic’s 
case.62 The second limb of Justice Deane’s test focused on whether the belief of the accused was 
not a reasonable response. Yeo argues that Justice Deane’s approach is better in principle but the 
 
62 Zecevic v DPP (1985) 162 CLR 645, 681. 
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test of a reasonable response is likely to be easier for juries to use, particularly if this is a fully 
objective test, as is the case in South Australia.63  
Nevertheless, this approach still raises a number of concerns. 
First, treating self-defence as a two-step process sets a low bar for excusing a person who kills 
another person, because the first step (believing it is necessary to act in self-defence) is not 
qualified by any requirement of reasonableness. Having this low bar in defensive homicide means 
that the test is further restricted to situations in which the accused believes it is necessary to defend 
himself or herself from the infliction of death or really serious injury. Including this restriction would 
mean that self-defence would differ depending on the offence as is currently the case. This is 
undesirable. As discussed in Part 4 of this paper, if defensive homicide is abolished and common 
law self-defence is codified, there are significant benefits in simplifying the law and the directions 
the trial judge must give to a jury where murder and manslaughter offences are being considered 
together. 
Secondly, although it is less complex than the VLRC draft provision, the South Australian and New 
South Wales provisions, and defensive homicide, the above model would still be difficult and likely 
to be confusing for the jury. Self-defence is necessarily general and involves proof that the accused 
did not have certain states of mind. The unavoidable degree of complexity arises from making 
available both a complete defence (self-defence) and a partial defence (excessive self-defence), 
which in part cover the same ground.64 Recognising qualifications to parts of this test involves 
reasonably fine-grained distinctions. This is part of the irreducible level of complexity inherent in 
excessive self-defence tests. As the Model Criminal Code Officers Committee (MCCOC) said, in its 
1998 Discussion Paper on Fatal Offences: 
What is required is a test which sets out with some precision how the judge is to direct 
the jury on excessive self-defence. When this task is embarked upon, the result tends to 
be an unworkably complicated test more apt to confuse than assist. 65 
Thirdly, all of the criticisms concerning the outcomes produced by defensive homicide (in terms of 
convictions) would still apply to this approach (see the discussion later in this part). The only 
difference with this approach is that it may be less complicated than defensive homicide.  
Fourthly, while this approach is less complicated than defensive homicide, it fails to meet the 
standard set recently by Justice Weinberg when commenting on defensive homicide:  
The doctrine of self-defence should never have been made so difficult to follow. That 
defence is, after all, perhaps the oldest, and most basic, of all excuses in the criminal law. 
It should be possible to explain its operation to a jury in just a few short sentences. In 
Zecevic, the High Court showed that this could be done.66 
2.5.6 Conclusion  
While it is possible to reduce the level of complexity of defensive homicide, this reduction is one of 
degree rather than kind. The complexity of the law is a significant problem. It makes the task of the 
jury much more difficult in understanding and applying the law. It is more difficult for judges to 
 
63 Stanley Yeo, ‘Revisiting Excessive Self-Defence’ (2000−2001) 12 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 39, 47−8. 
64 It is for this reason (among others) that self-defence and defensive homicide are currently structured the way they are in 
Victoria, as separate provisions which do not overlap. 
65 Model Criminal Code Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Model Criminal Code Chapter 
5: Fatal Offences Against the Person, Discussion Paper (1998) 113. 
66 Justice Mark Weinberg, ‘The Criminal Law – A “Mildly Vituperative” Critique’ (2012) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 
1177, 1183. 
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explain complex laws and complexity increases the risk of errors in jury directions. Further, issues 
of complexity must be considered in the context of the whole trial. For instance, when a person is 
charged with murder, the jury will often also need to consider the alternative offence of 
manslaughter. Any differences between self-defence as it applies to murder and manslaughter 
make the jury’s task more difficult.  
While complexity is a very important issue, it is not the only relevant consideration in determining 
what our laws should be. If there are strong arguments for the retention of the law on defensive 
homicide or excessive self-defence from other policy grounds, these could override concerns about 
complexity and the difficulties in applying this law. 
2.6 Defensive homicide and women accused of murder 
2.6.1 Are the situations in which defensive homicide is used likely to change? 
We now have the benefit of over seven and a half years of operation of defensive homicide, which 
includes 28 convictions. These convictions and the circumstances in which they occur are not 
unexpected. It is highly likely that defensive homicide will continue to be applied in a way that is 
consistent with its use over the past seven and a half years. The statistical evidence concerning 
people who kill is very clear in Victoria, Australia and other similar jurisdictions; it is predominantly 
men. The Australian Institute of Criminology’s National Homicide Monitoring Program shows that 
men commit approximately 88% of homicides. In 2008–09 and 2009–10, the Australian Institute of 
Criminology found that 66% of intimate partner homicides involve men killing their female partners. 
As discussed in Part 1, women commit comparatively fewer homicides. Conclusive proof of the 
success or failure of defensive homicide based on the cases before the courts is likely to take many 
decades. This is because of a number of factors including: 
 the low number of instances in which women kill in response to family violence 
 of those women who are prosecuted, some will fall into the category of traditional self-
defence where the woman is responding to an immediate threat 
 some women will plead guilty to manslaughter or defensive homicide 
 it is very difficult to know the full facts of the situation of a woman who kills in response to 
family violence if she pleads guilty, and 
 there are different views about when it is necessary to use lethal force.    
When the Discussion Paper was released in 2010, the offence had been in operation for five years. 
In that five year period, there was not one case in which a woman who had killed in response to 
family violence needed to rely on excessive self-defence laws. This included either as an 
alternative verdict before a jury to a charge of murder or as the result of a plea agreement.  
As the Discussion Paper indicated, the two cases in that five year period where a woman killed in 
response to family violence, ‘SB’ and Freda Dimitrovski, were resolved without going to trial. In one 
case, the former DPP did not proceed with the charge and in another a Magistrate discharged the 
woman at a committal proceeding. Further, the ABC reported that the DPP’s ‘decision [in ‘SB’s 
case] also took into account new legal provisions in Victoria about self-defence and family 
violence’.67 Tyson has said that these cases ‘have been cautiously interpreted as a sign that the 
reforms are working’.68  
 
67 ABC Local Radio, ‘Charges Dropped against Teenager Who Killed Her Stepfather’, PM, 27 March 2009 (Mark Colvin), 
cited in Kellie Toole, ‘Self-Defence and the Reasonable Woman: Equality Before the New Victorian Law’ (2012) 36 
Melbourne University Law Review 250, 268.   
68 Danielle Tyson, Sex, Culpability and the Defence of Provocation (2012) 128. 
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Since the publication of the Discussion Paper in 2010, there have been 15 more defensive 
homicide convictions. Three of these convictions have been of women who have killed an intimate 
partner – Eileen Creamer, Karen Black and Jemma Edwards. In all three cases, evidence of a 
history of family violence was present, consisting of ongoing intimidation, harassment, physical 
violence and, in the cases of Eileen Creamer and Karen Black, pressure to engage in unwanted 
sexual acts.69  
Of these three cases, Black and Edwards pleaded guilty to defensive homicide. The only defensive 
homicide conviction of a woman by a jury was in Creamer’s case; this was also an unusual case. 
Although there was a history of family violence by the deceased towards Creamer, the difficulty with 
this case is in understanding why she needed to act in self-defence.  
Creamer and the deceased had been separated for various periods during their marriage. The 
killing occurred several months after Creamer came back to the relationship (from New Zealand) 
after a 13 month separation. This is unlike many family violence cases where it is extremely 
dangerous for the woman to leave the relationship. In addition, the trial judge’s finding that 
Creamer’s evidence did ‘not much accord with the known facts’70 casts doubt on the 
reasonableness of the grounds for her belief that her actions were necessary to defend herself from 
the infliction of death or really serious injury. As noted above, the trial judge concluded that the 
severity of the wounds inflicted demonstrated that Ms Creamer was ‘out of control’, and the Court of 
Appeal took the view that ‘insofar as it fell outside the parameters of murder, it did so only by a 
narrow margin’.    
Black’s case and Edwards’ case seem to fit more easily into the scenarios that were intended to be 
covered by the defensive homicide laws. Both cases involved long term family violence, but the 
threat to them (and the severity of the family violence context) appeared less serious than in the 
cases of ‘SB’ and Freda Dimitrovski.71 Further, the judge in Edwards’ case had serious reservations 
about the offender’s account. However, in both cases, the court acknowledged that the women’s 
response to the threat was affected by the long term family violence.     
The kind of situation in which defensive homicide is likely to be relevant in a trial does not arise very 
often. If a further review was to be conducted in five years time, there may be several more relevant 
cases like Creamer, Black and Edwards. However, there are likely to be few cases where there is 
long term family violence which squarely raises the law of self-defence in the way envisaged. To 
date there have been two cases (‘SB’ and Freda Dimitrovski) where self-defence has been 
successfully relied on, though both cases involved an immediate threat of harm.  
This is not to say that the unlikelihood of a law being used means that there should not be such a 
law. However, in this situation, the existence of the law has other consequences which need to be 
considered in determining the overall advantages and disadvantages of defensive homicide. 
2.6.2 Is a ‘safety-net’ necessary for women who kill in response to family 
violence?  
An important issue raised in a number of submissions concerns the adequacy of the law of self-
defence. If the law of self-defence is adequate, there should not be any need for a ‘safety-net’ 
recognising excessive self-defence as a separate offence. 
 
69 See R v Creamer [2011] VSC 196 and R v Black [2011] VSC 152. Ongoing intimidation and harassment falls under the 
definition of ‘family violence’ under section 9AH of the Crimes Act 1958. 
70 R v Creamer [2011] VSC 196 [24]. 
71 These cases are discussed in Part 4 of the Discussion Paper. 
                                  Defensive Homicide 
 
                                                    24 
   
 
                                                
The VLRC highlighted concerns that because the law of self-defence has traditionally been 
associated with one-off, violent confrontations between two, equally strong men (in which the threat 
of death or really serious injury was imminent), it is interpreted and applied in a way that 
disadvantages women.  
As Toole writes: 
A succession of Australian studies has found that a high proportion of women who kill an 
intimate partner are responding to long-term violence by the partner. In these situations, 
women typically do not respond during a violent attack, and as they are often smaller and 
less experienced in physical combat than their victims, frequently use a weapon when 
retaliating. The actions of abused women, therefore, often lack both immediacy and 
proportionality… 
When an abused woman is convicted of murder on this basis, she has been denied the 
protection of self-defence because her actions do not conform to established patterns of 
male violence. This constitutes a gender bias in the interpretation and application 
(although not the framing) of the defence, which is inconsistent with the bedrock principle 
of equality before the law.72  
The Crimes (Homicide) Act introduced significant changes to the law of self-defence, particularly in 
the context of family violence. As discussed above, the cases of ‘SB’ and Freda Dimitrovski 
conducted under the new laws suggest that real improvements have been made in the way in 
which the law operates. Neither case proceeded to trial. The new self-defence laws and evidentiary 
provisions were cited by the DPP and the magistrate as being important in their decisions to end 
proceedings in each case.73  
However, one question posed in the Discussion Paper was whether the laws of self-defence would 
work adequately in the situation of a woman who kills in response to family violence where the 
family violence has reduced or ceased for some time before the killing occurs. In the cases of ‘SB’ 
and Freda Dimitrovski, the killings were immediately connected to family violence.  
The fact that immediacy was not in issue in either case, means that these cases do not assist in 
advancing our understanding of how the laws might work in less traditional kinds of self-defence. 
This point was made in the submission from Tyson, Capper and Kirkwood. 
Considering how self-defence laws might operate in the absence of an immediate threat is 
exceptionally difficult to answer in the abstract. How long had the family violence been going on 
for? What was the nature of the violence? What was the nature of the relationship and power or 
control of the deceased over the woman who killed? What level of cessation or reduction in 
violence was there? Did this matter in any event because the level of control or power was such 
that the only reason the violence reduced was because the woman had more successfully 
navigated around the deceased’s behaviour? Most importantly, all of this depends on the question 
why the woman believed it was necessary to kill.  
The way in which the laws of self-defence have operated mean that a jury may well acquit a woman 
of murder in this scenario because of the laws of self-defence and not need to rely on excessive 
self-defence. However, because the law sets the test and the test must be applied in a myriad of 
different situations, it is not possible to answer this question definitively. Further, to construct the 
law in such a way to guarantee the outcome in such a situation would create its own problems. It 
would be subject to similar criticism to those made of the proposal to limit defensive homicide to 
instances of serious family violence. 
 
72 Kellie Toole, ‘Self-Defence and the Reasonable Woman: Equality Before the New Victorian Law’ (2012) 36 Melbourne 
University Law Review 250, 256−7. 
73 Ibid 267−71. 
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What is essential for these purposes is that it is well within the operation of the laws of self-defence 
that a woman could be acquitted on the basis of self-defence in this situation. Whether that is the 
case is a matter of fact that would need to be determined by a jury on a case by case basis. 
While self-defence laws in Queensland are more restrictive than in Victoria because they require 
the identification of a specific assault and the imminence of a further assault or danger, they have 
been successfully used in two more recent cases by women who have killed in response to family 
violence. Douglas has described the two women (Falls and Irsliger) and their cases as follows: 
Both were smaller than their partners, white, drug-free, monogamous and without a 
criminal record. They suffered fierce physical abuse over many years, actively protected 
their children from the abuser and the killing was, apparently, the first time they had 
physically fought back. Both had attempted to leave the relationship and both had sought 
assistance from the police in the past. In both cases the abuser had harmed animals and 
threatened their own children with violence. In both cases they were acquitted by the jury. 
In comparison, the other women whose cases I have reviewed in this article, fell short of 
the benchmark in some way. Ney, an Indigenous woman, was larger than the deceased; 
she had drug and alcohol issues, a criminal record and had been in a series of violent 
relationships. There was evidence she had fought back before.74 
These cases show the importance of social context evidence and that self-defence laws can work 
effectively for women who kill in response to family violence. However, as Douglas highlights, Falls 
and Irsliger fit more readily within stereotypes about ‘battered women’.  
Commenting on who falls within a defence and who does not is also difficult because legal 
categories can be stark compared with degrees of family violence and degrees of threats posed. 
Further, different views come into play. Killing in response to family violence does not provide 
immunity from homicide laws. However, what degree of threat must be posed, and the many ways 
in which that threat may arise, make it difficult to say whether a jury verdict rejecting a claim of self-
defence is appropriate. While there are good reasons for concluding that the law of self-defence 
works (and is capable of working) reasonably well, when complemented by social context evidence 
laws, and that defensive homicide is unlikely to be necessary in a trial, there are no guarantees in 
relation to individual cases.   
Sheehy, Stubbs and Tolmie’s analysis of homicide prosecutions of battered women across 
Australia between 2000 and 2010 found that almost 50% of women who went to trial were acquitted 
on all charges: 
This suggests that there is now some recognition, for the purposes of applying the law on 
self-defence, of both the dangerous nature of intimate partner violence and the limited 
resources available to some battered women to achieve safety.75     
Another factor to consider is whether the existence of defensive homicide has in some ways 
distorted the legal landscape. The focus of debate concerning women who kill in response to family 
violence has become about defensive homicide, not self-defence. It should be the other way 
around. It is almost as if the perception and analysis of the laws concerning family violence, and 
whether family violence is appropriately recognised by the law, is considered through the lens of 
defensive homicide, rather than though self-defence laws. For instance, Fitz-Gibbon and Pickering 
state that: 
Our data analysis is informed by this principle in relation to the introduction of the offence 
of defensive homicide as a reform designed to bring women’s stories into the courtroom, to 
 
74 Heather Douglas, ‘A Consideration of the Merits of Specialised Homicide Offences and Defences for Battered Women’ 
(2012) 45 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 367, 377. 
75 Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie, ‘Battered Women Charged with Homicide in Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand: How Do They Fare?’ (2012) 45(3) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 383, 388. 
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recognize the violence (including the threat of violence and abuse) perpetrated against 
them, particularly in relation to battered women who kill.76 
While defensive homicide is a reform that is relevant in this regard, the primary way in which 
women’s stories (in this context) should enter the courtroom is through the operation of self-
defence. It is only if these arguments are not successful that the safety-net of defensive homicide 
should consequentially be relevant to the proceedings.  
In the context of changes to the operation of provocation in Queensland: 
Douglas has recently argued that while this has allowed some recognition and 
contextualisation of women’s experiences, it has produced a range of ambivalent results. 
One practical effect has been to direct battered women away from the complete defence of 
self-defence to the provocation defence instead.77  
A similar comment could be made about the operation of self-defence in Victoria. This is not to 
criticise the function of, and need for, contextualisation of women’s experiences as part of the law 
of self-defence as currently occurs in Victoria through section 9AH of the Crimes Act. The issue is 
with defensive homicide and the way in which it removes or dilutes the relevance of 
contextualisation evidence from the primary issue of the complete defence of self-defence. As Fitz-
Gibbon and Pickering say about defensive homicide: 
What this defence provides is a half-way house or ‘safety-net’ for these women, when the 
law could instead be further reformed to accommodate their circumstances in terms of an 
arguably more accurate legal category of self-defence. Consequently, through the 
inclusion of stories of battered women who kill under the offence of defensive homicide, 
battered women have come to occupy a compromised legal category.78  
2.6.3 Conclusion 
While there is some cause for believing that there have been improvements in the operation of self-
defence and the social context evidentiary provisions which support them, there is no clear 
evidence that defensive homicide is working in the way intended to support women who kill in 
response to family violence. Further, there is some evidence to suggest that its existence may be 
counter-productive.  
In over seven and a half years of operation, there has been one trial where a woman was convicted 
of defensive homicide and two women have pleaded guilty to defensive homicide. To obtain a 
small, but potentially sufficient, sample of defensive homicide trials involving women, there would 
need to be at least 10 trials. At the current rate, it would take 75 years before 10 women would be 
convicted of defensive homicide at trial. This is because women do not often kill. When they do kill 
it can be in a variety of different circumstances and only some of these may shed light on the 
operation of defensive homicide. 
From a policy perspective, it should be remembered that the VLRC ‘considered arguments for and 
against the reintroduction of excessive self-defence and on balance is in favour of its reintroduction 
in Victoria.79  
 
76 Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Sharon Pickering, ‘Homicide Law Reform in Victoria, Australia: From Provocation to Defensive 
Homicide and Beyond’ (2012) 52 British Journal of Criminology 158, 160. The authors are referring to the ‘principle of 
discursiveness’ which is ‘concerned with bringing inside the discursive circle of justice those who are excluded from it, and 
challenging the ways that legal claims can often only be acknowledged if they are “voiced in terms of the dominant group”’.  
77 Danielle Tyson, Sex, Culpability and the Defence of Provocation (2012) 125. 
78 Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Sharon Pickering, ‘Homicide Law Reform in Victoria, Australia: From Provocation to Defensive 
Homicide and Beyond’ (2012) 52 British Journal of Criminology 158, 177. 
79 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) 101 (emphasis added). 
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During its consultations, stakeholders expressed ‘mixed views’ about its reintroduction. The VLRC 
noted that three submissions specifically opposed the reintroduction of excessive self-defence, 
including one from the Federation of Community Legal Centres’ Violence Against Women and 
Children Working Group.80  
In practice, some concerns have arisen that defensive homicide may be operating to distort the role 
of self-defence and play a more important role than self-defence. The VLRC always envisaged that 
the primary changes needed to be made to self-defence, with defensive homicide being a ‘safety-
net’. The focus has disproportionately shifted to defensive homicide. This creates the risk that the 
community may see women who kill in response to family violence as acting unreasonably.    
2.7 Defensive homicide and men accused of murder 
If defensive homicide was only available to women, there would be no clear evidence that it has 
had any negative effect on the operation of the criminal justice system. However, defensive 
homicide is also available to men and 25 of the 28 defensive homicide convictions have been of 
men. 
The cases to date in Victoria, combined with data from other jurisdictions about the circumstances 
in which men kill, indicate that there is no reason to expect that defensive homicide will operate 
differently in the future. It will continue to be primarily relied upon by men and often in non-family 
violence situations. This is the very antithesis of the reason for introducing defensive homicide. 
2.7.1 Is defensive homicide like provocation? 
Some submissions referred to the similarities between provocation and defensive homicide.81 As 
Tyson has said, ‘it would certainly appear that in some of these cases, provocation-type arguments 
are being mobilised in the guise of defensive homicide’.82 It is therefore worth considering defensive 
homicide through the prism of analysis applied to provocation.  
The VLRC recommended that provocation be repealed because it had failed to evolve sufficiently 
to keep pace with changing attitudes in society. By reducing murder to manslaughter, provocation 
was considered to condone male aggression towards women and it was often relied upon by men 
who killed their current or former partners. This, and the homosexual advance claim,83 were the 
most egregious situations in which men relied on provocation to (partially) excuse their behaviour. 
However, men have also relied on provocation when they killed other men, where no homosexual 
advance was claimed.  
The VLRC identified six key reasons for the repeal of provocation.84 The practical application of 
defensive homicide as considered in the Discussion Paper reveals a similar history: 
a. a loss of self-control is evident in approximately half of the cases 
b. gender bias may be present because self-defence readily accommodates 
immediate responses to violence by men 
c. acting without reasonable grounds for doing so has in effect privileged a loss of 
self-control in some cases (a loss of self-control is evident in at least 10 of the 25 
cases involving men (as discussed below)) 
 
80 Ibid 98−9. 
81 See, for example, submission by Kate Fitz-Gibbon and submission by Tyson, Capper and Kirkwood. 
82 Danielle Tyson, Sex, Culpability and the Defence of Provocation (2012) 131. 
83 The homosexual advance defence was a specific use of the partial defence of provocation to the offence of murder (i.e. 
reducing a charge of murder to manslaughter) in circumstances where a person has killed another person of the same sex 
who made an unwanted sexual advance.   
84 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) 26. 
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d. a culture of blaming the victim has persisted with defensive homicide — this is 
evident in a number of cases such as Middendorp and Smith (who said the victim 
threatened him and said Smith was gay)85  
e. excessive self-defence can be taken into account at sentencing (rather than being 
necessary as a partial defence to reduce a charge of murder to defensive 
homicide), and 
f. the test is complex and difficult. 
From a legal perspective, there are differences between defensive homicide and provocation: 
The LIV submits that, despite community concerns, defensive homicide is very different 
from the old partial defence of provocation. In the case of defensive homicide, the person 
intends to do something lawful, albeit with no reasonable grounds for the belief that what 
they did was necessary. With the abolished partial defence of provocation, the person 
intends to do something unlawful, but under a sudden and temporary loss of control. This 
distinction is vital, and the difference in culpability should continue to be recognised in the 
criminal law, through the offence of defensive homicide.86 
The VLRC applied this same reasoning to distinguish between provocation and excessive self-
defence. However, while this distinction can be drawn in principle, the application of the offence of 
defensive homicide in practice indicates that in a number of cases it bears significant similarities to 
provocation.  
The main point of difference between provocation and defensive homicide is that defensive 
homicide has been used in fewer cases to partially excuse violence by men towards women. 
Middendorp’s case is the only defensive homicide conviction of a man for killing a woman. The 
2010 conviction and sentencing of Luke Middendorp for the defensive homicide of his partner, Jade 
Bownds, led critics of defensive homicide to question the operation of the current law. In particular, 
whether rather than providing a half-way house for battered women, the offence instead provides 
an avenue of excuse for jealous men, similar to that of the now abolished provocation defence.87   
2.7.2 Does defensive homicide only apply to ‘defensive’ situations? 
There are a number of defensive homicide cases where the defensive nature of the offender’s 
conduct is difficult to identify or explain. Short summaries of defensive homicide cases are 
contained in Appendices 2 and 3.  
Five of the 13 defensive homicide cases considered in the Discussion Paper involved the offender 
inflicting many injuries: 
 Giammona stabbed the victim 16 times 
 Smith stabbed the victim 50–60 times 
 Baxter stabbed the victim 11 times 
 Trezise stabbed the victim 36 times, and 
 Parr stabbed the victim 20 times. 
The above cases have been identified because they involved more than 10 stab wounds. 
Therefore, the defensive nature of the wounds inflicted is much more difficult to determine. 
 
85 R v Smith [2008] VSC 617 [9]. This issue is also discussed in Part 4 concerning evidentiary issues. However, (full) self-
defence will also involve some examination of the victim’s conduct as it is integral to the consideration of whether the 
accused believed that it was necessary to defend themselves. 
86 Submission by the Law Institute of Victoria.  
87 See submission from Tyson, Capper and Kirkwood, and Kate Fitz-Gibbon, ‘Defensive Homicide Law Akin to Getting Away 
with Murder’, The Australian (Melbourne) 3 March 2012. 
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Since the Discussion Paper, the following additional cases also involved the offender inflicting 
many injuries: 
 Ghazlan stabbed the victim repeatedly (the number of times was not specified, but included 
stab wounds to the eye region, chin, neck and abdomen, as well as defensive wounds) 
 Svetina caused 10 wounds to the victim with a tomahawk 
 Edwards caused approximately 30 wounds to the victim with a knife 
 Dambitis repeatedly hit the victim with an object 
 Creamer inflicted a number of injuries with a blunt instrument and also stabbed the victim, 
and 
 Chen stabbed the victim approximately 15 times. 
These cases raise two issues. First, is this the type of conduct that should be partially excused? 
Secondly, if the answer to this question is yes, it raises issues with the name of the offence. 
As discussed above, the loss of self-control in many of these cases has all the hallmarks of 
provocation cases. In his submission, the former DPP indicated that ‘as presently framed defensive 
homicide is conceptually capable of legitimising or diminishing the seriousness of some homicides’.  
The department’s view is that there are a significant number of cases in which defensive homicide 
is being used to partially excuse conduct that should not be partially excused because of a loss of 
self-control, or certainly not to the extent that warrants a reduction in the maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment (murder) to 20 years’ imprisonment (defensive homicide).  
In submissions and consultations in 2010, stakeholders expressed concern about the name of the 
offence. The Discussion Paper considered the importance of ‘fair labelling’ of offences. In 
consultations, the Coalition for Safer Communities expressed the view that many of the situations in 
which defensive homicide is used do not seem ‘defensive’ in any way.  
The label ‘defensive homicide’ is apt for the ‘safety-net’ cases discussed by the VLRC. However, it 
is an inappropriate label for the most typical forms of defensive homicide in practice. If defensive 
homicide is to be retained, a new name for the offence is required.  
2.7.3 What does defensive homicide say about killing by men? 
Howe indicates in her submission that:  
Centring a reform on the figure of the battered woman killer has the effect of disavowing 
the far more fundamental problem of the gender asymmetry of homicides, including sexual 
intimacy homicides. As countless empirical studies have shown, these homicides are 
overwhelmingly committed by men. It follows that any reform intended to assist the rare 
case of a woman who kills a male partner in the context of family violence will be used 
much more frequently by the far more numerous male defendants who kill using excessive 
force in a range of different contexts. 
The evidence over many years and in similar jurisdictions consistently indicates that men kill 
women partners overwhelmingly more often than women kill men partners. The operation of 
defensive homicide in Victoria indicates that after seven and a half years, 25 men have been 
convicted of defensive homicide and three women have been convicted of defensive homicide. 
There is no reason to suspect that this trend will change significantly in the future as it generally 
reflects the fact that approximately 88% of homicides are committed by men.  
In this way, the very existence of defensive homicide inappropriately condones or excuses male 
violence. 
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Defensive homicide supports a culture of blaming the victim 
The operation of defensive homicide indicates that the culture of blaming the victim, which was at 
its strongest with the law of provocation, remains. As Howe puts it: 
Off-setting the abolition of the provocation defence with the introduction of a new partial 
defence … [ensured] that juries would continue to hear the kind of exculpatory victim-
blaming legal argument and evidence that the abolition of provocation was designed to 
address.88 
The culture of blaming the victim also works significantly to the disadvantage of women as women 
are overwhelmingly more likely to be killed by men than they are to kill men.  
Abolishing defensive homicide should reduce victim blaming as it will no longer partially excuse 
male violence. However, as self-defence involves an analysis of what the victim was doing, or had 
done over a long period of time, to determine whether the accused had reasonable grounds for 
believing that it was necessary to use lethal force, the abolition of defensive homicide will not totally 
remove the prospect of some victim blaming.89 
Abolishing defensive homicide does not preclude the development of other laws and practices to 
mitigate the risk of a woman who kills in response to family violence being inappropriately convicted 
of murder (e.g. see Part 4 which contains questions about possible reforms to the laws of 
evidence). ‘Inappropriate’ is used because it may be that a judge and jury and legal practitioners 
who fully understand the nature of family violence and all other relevant matters may conclude that 
it was not necessary to kill in self-defence. Whether that is the case is a matter for the jury to 
determine. It is not the objective of defensive homicide laws to provide immunity for killing in 
response to family violence. Each case must be assessed individually. 
2.7.4 Conclusion 
While the evidence concerning the outcomes of defensive homicide where women kill may be 
equivocal, that is not the case when it is applied to men who kill.  
Because of the way in which it operates, it is apparent that defensive homicide will: 
 if relevant, only be relevant in a small number of cases in which a woman kills a man  
 be relevant in a significant number of cases in condoning or excusing male violence and 
continuing a culture of blaming the victim, and  
 sometimes be relied upon by a man who kills a woman partner (e.g. Middendorp’s case).  
Retaining defensive homicide (even if subject to further review) gives primacy to the need to ensure 
that the law does everything possible to recognise the position of a woman who kills in response to 
family violence.  
If defensive homicide has a role, it is in this limited safety-net role where the main processes have 
not worked to provide substantive equality to women who have acted in self-defence. The likelihood 
of this being necessary depends upon the effectiveness of self-defence which should be the 
primary focus of reforms for women who kill in response to family violence.  
From a utilitarian perspective, the issue is whether this narrow (potential) role for defensive 
homicide outweighs the clear and substantial cost of defensive homicide operating to partially 
excuse or condone the violence of men who kill. 
 
88 Submission by Associate Professor Adrian Howe, Social Science, RMIT. 
89 This paper proposes a number of other changes to further reduce the risk of victim blaming (see Part 4).  
                                  Defensive Homicide 
 
                                                    31 
   
 
                                                
2.8 What might happen if defensive homicide were abolished? 
In 68% of defensive homicide cases to date, the conviction has been the result of a plea of guilty. In 
the remaining 32% of convictions, a jury reached the conclusion that the accused was not guilty of 
murder, but guilty of defensive homicide. If defensive homicide is abolished and other 
improvements are made to self-defence and evidence laws as proposed in the remainder of this 
paper, the potential role for a partial defence like defensive homicide is further limited.  
With the removal of the partial excuse of defensive homicide, a person who believes it is necessary 
to kill in self-defence, but does not have reasonable grounds for that belief, will be guilty of murder. 
Does this mean that in practice all people who would have been convicted of defensive homicide 
will instead be convicted of murder? 
In nine cases, a jury found the accused guilty of defensive homicide. The absence of this partial 
excuse should, in theory, mean that these cases result in murder convictions. However, as 
discussed above, there is some possibility of compromise verdicts and it cannot be said with 
absolute certainty that a jury would have returned a verdict of guilty of murder in these cases.  
2.8.1 Defensive homicide and pleas of guilty 
With all of the problems concerning defensive homicide, the question must be asked, why is it 
being used? Of the 28 convictions for defensive homicide, 19 convictions have been the result of a 
plea of guilty. The DPP does not normally publish reasons for accepting pleas of guilty. However, 
the DPP does publish reasons why in general a plea may be accepted. The DPP’s reasons explain 
both why the DPP may decide not to proceed with a charge of murder and why a plea of guilty to 
defensive homicide may be chosen, rather than manslaughter. 
The DPP may have formed the view that there was no reasonable prospect of a conviction for 
murder and therefore defensive homicide was the most serious charge that the DPP could 
reasonably proceed with. The DPP Prosecutions Policies identify a number of reasons why this 
may occur including: 
 the lack of witnesses 
 the lack of independent witnesses 
 problems with the reliability of witnesses (e.g. because of their drug or alcohol 
consumption), and  
 the evidence disproving the accused’s claim of self-defence may not be strong.  
The next issue is why a plea to defensive homicide was accepted rather than a plea to 
manslaughter. The most likely reason for this is that the offence of defensive homicide involves 
proof that the offender intended to cause death or really serious injury. There are two kinds of 
manslaughter (for present purposes).90 Manslaughter may be committed by an unlawful and 
dangerous act or by criminal negligence. 
When provocation existed, it was also a form of manslaughter. Like defensive homicide, it involved 
proof that the offender intended to cause death or really serious injury. Provocation manslaughter 
was regarded by the courts as the most serious kind of manslaughter and was therefore more likely 
to attract a higher sentence than would be imposed for other kinds of manslaughter; there were of 
course notable exceptions to this general rule. However, in recent years, sentences imposed for 
 
90 Culpable driving is also a form of manslaughter, as is child homicide. However, the particular factual situations in which 
those offences apply are not relevant in this discussion.  
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unlawful and dangerous act manslaughter have increased and are very similar to the sentences 
that were imposed when provocation manslaughter existed.91 
Without provocation manslaughter, defensive homicide provides the only offence (equivalent to 
manslaughter) that involves proof that the offender intended to cause death or really serious injury. 
Without this element, it may be more difficult for the DPP to accept a plea in such cases because it 
may be more difficult to explain the case appropriately to the court. These complexities for the 
prosecution will then flow on to the judge in trying to sentence the accused for the offence.  
However, some of these difficulties already exist in different situations with the offence of 
manslaughter. 92 As noted by Tate JA in Kells v The Queen, ‘the offence of manslaughter by 
unlawful and dangerous act is subject to considerable variance in the conduct constituting the 
commission of the offence and, as such, its gravity’.93 Sentencing for manslaughter (unlawful and 
dangerous act) encompasses instances of killing that appear to involve intention to cause death or 
serious injury, but resolve as manslaughter.94 This may arise for a number of reasons including a 
jury verdict, a technical issue or guilty plea to the lesser offence. 
2.8.2 The relevance of sentencing discretion 
While it was the VLRC’s overarching view that the culpability of an offender should be dealt with at 
the time of sentencing, the VLRC Report recommended the reinstatement of the partial defence of 
excessive self-defence. Therefore, the VLRC proposed that excessive self-defence (defensive 
homicide) should be an exception to their general view that such matters concerning the level of 
culpability of an offender should be determined at the time of sentencing.  
Abolishing defensive homicide would have the net effect of leaving issues of such degrees of 
culpability to the sentencing judge. This would be consistent with the VLRC’s general approach to 
matters which should be part of an offence and those matters that are more appropriately dealt with 
at the time of sentencing. 
If a plea or conviction for manslaughter replaces defensive homicide, the same maximum penalty 
will apply, namely 20 years’ imprisonment. The highest penalty imposed for defensive homicide to 
date is 12 years’ imprisonment with a minimum of eight years’ imprisonment before being eligible 
for parole (Middendorp). The average maximum sentence imposed is 8.9 years’ imprisonment. For 
the offence of manslaughter between 2005–06 and 2009–10, five sentences of 12 years’ 
imprisonment or more were imposed.  
If defensive homicide were abolished and a case arose in which a woman killed in response to 
family violence and was neither acquitted because of self-defence nor convicted of manslaughter 
but was instead convicted of murder, the court retains a discretion as to the maximum penalty that 
it imposes. As discussed above, only one woman in Australia was found guilty of murder between 
2000 and 2010. Further, Victoria has better social context evidence laws than any other Australian 
 
91 Sentencing Advisory Council, Sentencing Snapshot: Sentencing trends in the higher courts of Victoria 2005–06 to 2009–
10, Manslaughter (May 2011). 
92  For an offence of manslaughter committed in the context of long-term serious family violence, see also R v Charles [2013] 
VSC 470. 
93 Kells v The Queen [2013] VSCA 7 [48]. 
94 In R v AB (No 2) (2008) 18 VR 391, the accused purchased a shotgun and lethal ammunition shortly before killing the 
victim. The jury found AB not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter. In R v Kell & Dey [2009] VSC 90, the jury found 
the two accused not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter. The trial judge indicated that it appeared that the jury 
could not decide who had the knife; if they had, it was likely they would have convicted that accused of murder. In Sherna 
v The Queen [2011] VSCA 242, the accused strangled his wife with a dressing gown cord for three minutes until she died. 
He admitted thinking he wanted to kill her minutes before strangling her. The jury found Sherna not guilty of murder, but 
guilty of manslaughter. See also Richard G Fox and Arie Freiberg, Sentencing: State and Federal Law in Victoria (2nd ed, 
1999) 892. 
 
                                  Defensive Homicide 
 
                                                    33 
   
 
immediate.  
                                                
jurisdiction. While the risk of conviction for murder based on misconceptions and outdated or 
stereotypical views about family violence cannot be ignored, it is unlikely. 
2.9 The department’s proposals 
It is often common ground between those who support the abolition of defensive homicide and 
those who wish it to be retained for a further period that the law: 
 should not condone or excuse in some way male violence towards women or men 
 should not permit a culture of focusing on blaming the victims, and 
 should recognise the position of a woman who kills in response to family violence.   
As the VLRC said, '[w]omen who kill abusive partners should not be automatically entitled to an 
acquittal on the basis of self-defence'.95 The primary focus of the law in relation to women who kill 
in response to family violence should be through the law of self-defence. The principal objective of 
the VLRC was to make clear that a range of evidence is admissible to understand family violence 
and to ensure that self-defence clearly recognises that a person may act in self-defence even 
where the threat to their life is not immediate. The issue should be whether a person’s conduct in 
self-defence is necessary even if the threat is not 
Assessing whether a woman has acted in self-defence involves consideration of whether the 
woman believed it was necessary to use lethal force and whether there were reasonable grounds 
for that belief. This test involves an assessment of the threat faced by the woman. Laws designed 
to ensure that the jury is fully informed by social context evidence about the dynamics of family 
violence are essential to provide substantive equality for women through self-defence laws.  
There is reason to believe that the social context evidence provisions have had some beneficial 
impact in cases such as ‘SB’ and Dimitrovski. However, as Toole writes, the improvements to self-
defence laws are ‘critically limited by the concurrent enactment of defensive homicide, which rests 
on the conception of the belief and behaviour of abused women as not being reasonable’.96   
When the VLRC recommended the introduction of excessive self-defence as a ‘safety-net’, it could 
not be certain about the ways in which self-defence and excessive self-defence laws would 
operate. While there are still a number of improvements that can be made (these are discussed 
below in this paper), there is no clear evidence of the need for a ‘safety-net’.  
Data concerning the outcomes in cases where women kill in response to family violence indicate 
that the risk of being convicted of murder is low. Across Australia during the period 2000–2010, two 
women were convicted of murder. One of these women pleaded guilty to murder, but the judge 
acknowledged that the case was more like manslaughter than murder.97  This data includes 
jurisdictions that do not recognise excessive self-defence and no other jurisdiction during 2000–
2010 had a social context evidentiary provision equivalent to Victoria’s (in section 9AH of the 
Crimes Act). 
Further, it is not at all clear that, in any of the Victorian cases in which a woman has relied on 
defensive homicide, the primary self-defence laws failed to appropriately recognise that the woman 
acted in self-defence. It is also important to remember that the High Court said in Zecevic’s case 
 
95 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) xxvi. 
96 Kellie Toole, ‘Self-Defence and the Reasonable Woman: Equality before the New Victorian Law’ (2012) 36 Melbourne 
University Law Review 250, 286. 
97 Elizabeth Sheehy, Julie Stubbs and Julia Tolmie, ‘Battered Women Charged with Homicide in Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand: How Do They Fare?’ (2012) 45(3) Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 383, 389. 
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that the jury must approach its task of determining self-defence in a practical manner, without 
undue nicety and giving proper weight to the predicament of the accused.98 
Creamer’s case is the only case in which a jury convicted a woman of defensive homicide. As 
Toole says: 
Creamer indicates that the new provisions can also activate those pre-existing stereotypes 
in a way that stretches the protection of defensive homicide beyond its intended 
boundaries, to circumstances where conviction for murder might be more in line with 
community expectations and standards.99 
Further, the operation of defensive homicide has significant problems in itself because:  
 a significant number of defensive homicide cases do not seem to be ‘defensive’; instead 
they reflect a loss of self-control 
 a significant number of defensive homicide cases are quite similar to provocation  
 defensive homicide is very complex 
 defensive homicide may increase the risk of compromise verdicts, and  
 defensive homicide condones or partially excuses male violence. 
The significant disadvantages with recognising defensive homicide (excessive self-defence) 
outweigh the benefits, should they ever be needed, of a ‘safety-net’.  
The department agrees with the VRLC’s framing of these challenging issues:  
Different legal systems take account of levels of blameworthiness in different ways. When 
law reform bodies have reviewed defences and partial defences to homicide, they have 
frequently reached different conclusions on how factors which affect the culpability of the 
accused should be taken into account by the criminal law. While there is no ‘right’ 
approach to these complex moral and legal issues, the Commission believes there is a 
need for greater consistency in how issues of culpability are dealt with in the Victorian 
criminal law. The legal framework in which defences to homicide operate in Victoria, 
including the existence of a flexible sentencing regime for murder, has influenced our 
approach, as has the symbolic function of the criminal law in setting the limits of 
acceptable and unacceptable behaviour, and the likely practical implications of our 
recommendations.100 
However, the department now has the benefit of considering over seven and a half years of 
practical operation of defensive homicide. As a result, the department considers that defensive 
homicide (excessive self-defence) does not appropriately set limits on acceptable and 
unacceptable behaviour. Accordingly, the department proposes that defensive homicide be 
abolished. Further, while some improvements could be made to the operation of excessive self-
defence, it is highly likely to produce very similar outcomes to defensive homicide. Accordingly, the 
department proposes that excessive self-defence, even in a simplified form, should not be 
introduced in Victoria. 
The department considers that this will achieve greater consistency in dealing with issues of 
culpability in Victoria and will more appropriately set the limits of acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour. 
 
98  Zecevic v DPP (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645, 662–3. 
99 Kellie Toole, ‘Self-Defence and the Reasonable Woman: Equality before the New Victorian Law’ (2012) 36 Melbourne 
University Law Review 250, 286. 
100 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) xx. 
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2.9.1 Related issues 
These proposals shift the need for reform from defensive homicide to other matters such as further 
improvements to self-defence and evidence laws. These issues are discussed in Parts 3 and 4 of 
this paper. 
In more than half of manslaughter convictions across Australia, the jury returned a verdict of 
manslaughter on the basis of an unlawful and dangerous act for women who kill in response to 
family violence. This category of manslaughter involves a finding that the woman did not intend to 
kill or cause a really serious injury.  
From both the prosecution and defence perspectives, this may be unsatisfactory where it does not 
accurately recognise the intent of the woman. In discussing the offence of murder in England and 
Wales, Quick and Wells have said that one of the two major difficulties has been the challenge and 
difficulty of ‘capturing culpability in a nuanced way through the mechanics of the element of 
“intention to cause death or serious bodily harm”’.101 The former DPP indicated that one reason for 
retaining defensive homicide is that it ‘fills an important gap in the law’, concerning the elements of 
the offences of murder and manslaughter. 
This view also underpinned some other submissions that provided some support for defensive 
homicide, while acknowledging its significant problems. Important offences like murder and 
manslaughter only exist at common law. This makes the task of identifying, or refining in any way, 
the elements of these offences very difficult. If the proposal to abolish defensive homicide is 
accepted, it will be important to review the elements of the offences of murder and manslaughter to 
determine whether murder and other fatal offences can be structured in a way that better reflects 
different kinds of culpability and allowing courts to impose appropriate sentences for those 
offences.  
 
Proposal 1 – Defensive homicide 
The department proposes that the offence of defensive homicide be abolished.  
Proposal 2 – Excessive self-defence 
The department proposes that excessive self-defence (in any form) should not be 
introduced.  
                                                 
101 Oliver Quick and Celia Wells, ‘Partial Reform of Partial Defences: Developments in England and Wales’ (2012) 45(3) 
Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 337, 338. The authors also refer to the other major difficulty in England 
and Wales being the commitment to a mandatory penalty of life imprisonment. As the maximum penalty of life 
imprisonment in Victoria is discretionary rather than mandatory, this problem does not arise in Victoria. 
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3 Self-Defence 
If defensive homicide (excessive self-defence) is abolished, how should self-defence operate? The 
discussion in Part 2 of this paper highlighted the importance of social context evidence in 
addressing misconceptions about family violence and the need to address complexities in the law.  
While defensive homicide (excessive self-defence) separates the accused’s belief that their actions 
were necessary in self-defence from the issue of whether they had reasonable grounds for that 
belief, abolishing defensive homicide will have the effect of bringing the two limbs back together.  
The test for self-defence has two limbs: 
 the person carried out their conduct believing that it was necessary to defend himself, 
herself or another person (from the infliction of death or really serious injury), and 
 the person had reasonable grounds for that belief. 
The words in brackets in the first limb apply only to the offence of murder. 
In this Part, we consider ways of improving self-defence and address necessary consequential 
issues that will arise if defensive homicide is abolished. 
3.1 Should the limitation on self-defence for the offence of murder 
remain? 
Because defensive homicide separates the two limbs of the common law test for self-defence, 
some further qualification of the first limb was necessary to avoid people inappropriately escaping 
liability for murder, based purely on a belief that it was necessary to use lethal force in self-defence, 
no matter how unreasonable that belief may be. Accordingly, when defensive homicide was 
introduced, it included a qualification to the first limb of self-defence. To be not guilty of murder, a 
person must believe that it is necessary to defend themselves or another from death or really 
serious injury.  
While the common law did not contain such a restriction, it would be rare for a person to have 
believed on reasonable grounds that it was necessary to defend themselves or another by using 
lethal force while not believing that they were protecting themselves or another from death or really 
serious injury. The High Court considered this issue in Zecevic’s case: 
A threat does not ordinarily call for that response [killing or doing serious bodily harm] 
unless it causes a reasonable apprehension on the part of that person of death or serious 
bodily harm. If the response of an accused goes beyond what he believed to be necessary 
to defend himself or if there were no reasonable grounds for belief on his part that the 
response was necessary in defence of himself, then the occasion will not have been one 
which would support a plea of self-defence.102 
The common law test appropriately dealt with this issue because it combined the two limbs of self-
defence. No other jurisdiction in Australia has included a qualification of the kind included in 
defensive homicide, in its self-defence laws.  
However, narrowing the first limb of the test is relevant in cases of women who kill in response to 
family violence. This is because some threats are difficult to categorise. For instance in Black’s 
 
102 Zecevic v DPP (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645 at 662 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
                                  Defensive Homicide 
 
                                                    37 
   
 
case, in which the accused pleaded guilty to defensive homicide, Black said that Clarke (her 
partner and the person she killed): 
 was never physically violent towards her (even though he would jab her in the head and 
chest) 
 would sometimes force himself upon her sexually, and 
 one time left a knife and gold coin on her pillow after she had been out with friends (Black 
did not elaborate on the meaning of this act). 
How should these threats be categorised? The advantage of the common law test is that it focuses 
on what the accused believed these threats and actions meant, and then whether the accused 
believed it was necessary to defend themselves, rather than whether they also specifically believed 
it was necessary to defend themselves from the infliction of death or really serious injury. As Toole 
says, the ‘narrowing of the range of possible threats that can sustain a self-defence argument might 
prove detrimental to improving their [abused women] position’.103  
Accordingly, the department proposes that this qualification be removed.  
This will have a significant consequential benefit in that it will mean that one test for self-defence 
applies to all offences to which it is relevant. A jury will often have to consider whether an accused 
is guilty of murder or manslaughter. Where self-defence is in issue, the proposed new test would 
mean that the trial judge only needs to explain self-defence to the jury in one way. It would no 
longer be necessary to explain the differences between self-defence for the offences of murder and 
manslaughter. 
This issue also arises in the context of attempted murder. When the DPP charges a person with 
attempted murder, the DPP almost invariably charges the alternative offence of intentionally 
causing serious injury. As the judge will need to direct the jury about self-defence in relation to both 
attempted murder and intentionally causing serious injury, having the same test for self-defence for 
both offences would be easier for the judge to explain to the jury and easier for the jury to 
understand.104 
 
Proposal 3 – Self-defence 
The department proposes that the first limb of the common law test of self-defence should 
be reinstated, namely, whether the accused believed that it was necessary to do what he or 
she did to defend himself, herself or another. 
 
3.2 Should the test for self-defence be ‘reasonable grounds’ or 
‘reasonable response’? 
Before the introduction of the Crimes (Homicide) Act in 2005, the Victorian law of self-defence was 
governed solely by the common law test as stated by the High Court in Zecevic’s case. In this case, 
the High Court set out the following test for self-defence: 
                                                 
103 Kellie Toole, ‘Self-Defence and the Reasonable Woman: Equality Before the New Victorian Law’ (2012) 36 Melbourne 
University Law Review 250, 264. 
104 In Babic v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 297 [96], Justices Neave and Harper indicated that a question which remained 
‘unresolved at the appellate level include[d] the relevance of statutory self-defence to attempted murder’. This proposal will 
resolve this question. 
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It is whether the accused believed on reasonable grounds that it was necessary in self-
defence to do what he [or she] did. If he or she had that belief and there were reasonable 
grounds for it, or if the jury is left in reasonable doubt about the matter, then he [or she] is 
entitled to an acquittal.105 
In Babic’s case, Justice Ashley indicated that: 
Self-defence post-Zecevic, though not without all difficulties, was satisfactorily explained to 
juries; and that is still the situation with respect to non-homicide offences.106  
Further, as Justice Weinberg has indicated, self-defence is an important and long-standing part 
of the law. It should be able to be easily expressed.107 
A number of jurisdictions (including New South Wales, Commonwealth, Northern Territory, South 
Australia and Western Australia) have modified this second limb of the test. In those jurisdictions, 
the test is whether what the accused did was a ‘reasonable response in the circumstances as 
perceived by the accused’. The VLRC also recommended that this formulation be used. 
While the VLRC / NSW test specifies that the test must be applied ‘in the circumstances as 
perceived by the accused’, this is essentially the same as the common law test. The JCV’s Criminal 
Charge Book discusses this aspect of the common law test: 
This is not a test about what the hypothetical ‘reasonable person’ might have believed in 
the circumstances, but about whether the accused had no reasonable grounds for his or 
her belief, in the circumstances as he or she perceived them to be (R v Portelli (2004) 148 
A Crim R 282 (Vic CA); Viro v R (1978) 141 CLR 88). … 
In determining whether the accused’s belief was not based on reasonable grounds, the 
jury may take into account the following matters:  
 The surrounding circumstances  
 All of the facts within the accused’s knowledge 
 The relationship between the parties involved  
 The prior conduct of the victim  
 Circumstances of family violence  
 The personal characteristics of the accused, such as:  
 Any deluded beliefs he or she held  
 Any excitement, affront or distress he or she was experiencing 
 The proportionality of the accused’s response  
 The accused’s failure to retreat.108 
In Australia, the ‘reasonable response’ test was derived from the recommendations of the Criminal 
Law Officers Committee (CLOC). CLOC argued that its formulation was similar to the common law 
Zecevic test but would simplify the law:  
The test as to necessity is subjective, but the test as to proportion is objective. It requires 
the response of the accused to be objectively proportionate to the situation which the 
accused subjectively believed she or he faced (the words ‘as perceived by him or her’ 
were added to make this clear).109 
 
105 Zecevic v DPP (Vic) (1987) 162 CLR 645, 661 (Wilson, Dawson and Toohey JJ). 
106 Babic v The Queen (2010) 28 VR 297 [18]. 
107 Justice Mark Weinberg, ‘The Criminal Law – A “Mildly Vituperative” Critique’ (2012) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 
1177, 1183. See also Justice Kevin Duggan, Law Report, ABC Radio National (Australia), 2 August 2011. 
108 udicial College of Victoria, Victorian Criminal Charge Book [8.9.2.1].  J
109 Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Model Criminal Code Chapters 1 and 2: General 
Principles of Criminal Responsibility, Report (1992) 69. 
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The differences between the common law and the ‘reasonable response’ test were considered by 
the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Trevenna where the court said that the 
statutory ‘[c]odification of what constitutes “self-defence” thereby refines and elaborates on the 
common law elements, but without introducing any major change’.110 Based on this, the VLRC 
considered that there was not likely to be much difference between the two tests and there were 
advantages in uniformity in adopting the same test that most other jurisdictions have adopted.111 
Further, the VLRC supported the view of Bronitt and McSherry that: 
Generally, if an offence requires a particular mental state as part of its definition, then a 
subjective test can be applied. However, a mental state forming part of a defence requires 
an objective test. This distinction is based on societal values. That is, before a society 
decides to exercise compassion by exculpating an accused from criminal liability, it is 
entitled to demand that the accused lacked any blameworthiness in relation to the plea 
relied on. As Stanley Yeo … has pointed out ‘[a]n unreasonable or negligently held belief 
would constitute blameworthiness denying the accused the excuse’.112  
The tests for reasonable grounds for a belief and reasonableness of response have traditionally 
been viewed as relating to the separate issues of necessity and proportionality. This is reflected by 
the statement in Fairall and Yeo that ‘the elements of threat perception and excessive force are 
sometimes merged; although closely connected, they are separable and should be separated’.113 
The test under the common law focuses on whether the accused had reasonable grounds for the 
belief that it was necessary to act in the circumstances as perceived by the accused.114 The test 
does not involve consideration of whether a reasonable person would have believed it was 
necessary to act. On the VLRC / NSW approach, the test is whether the accused’s response is a 
reasonable response (determined objectively) in the circumstances that the accused perceived 
(determined subjectively).115  
In Crawford, Neal Andrew v The Queen, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal considered 
the failure of the trial judge to direct the jury in relation to a mistaken but genuine belief in the 
necessity of self-defence, even where the complainant’s conduct was lawful.116 In the leading 
judgment, Fullerton J noted: 
In R v Katarzynski [2002] NSWSC 613, Howie J considered the effect of Pt 11 Div 3 of the 
Crimes Act on the issue of self-defence at common law. His Honour emphasised that 
s 418(2) is concerned not with the state of mind of a reasonable person but with the 
reasonableness of the conduct of the accused having regard to his or her state of mind. As 
applied to the facts of this case, it was sufficient if the appellant satisfied the jury that there 
was a reasonable possibility that he believed his conduct was necessary in order to defend 
himself, and a reasonable possibility that what he did was a reasonable response to the 
circumstances as he perceived them.117 
In the context of a woman who kills in response to family violence, this would mean that in 
considering self-defence: 
 the jury would need to consider whether the woman believed that it was necessary to act in 
self-defence, and 
 based on the circumstances as she perceived them to be, whether her response (in killing 
a partner) was a reasonable response. 
 
110 R v Trevenna [2004] NSWCCA 43, [38]. 
111 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) 88. 
112 Simon Bronitt and Bernadette McSherry, Principles of Criminal Law (2001) 305–6, citing Stanley Yeo, Compulsion and the 
Criminal Law (1990) 200. 
113 Paul A Fairall and Stanley Yeo, Criminal Defences in Australia (4th ed, 2005) 174. 
114 R v Portelli (2004) 10 VR 259 and R v Hawes (1994) 35 NSWLR 294, 306. 
115 See R v Burgess (2005) 152 A Crim R 100 and R v Katarzynski [2002] NSWSC 613. 
116 Crawford, Neal Andrew v The Queen [2008] NSWCCA 166. 
117 Ibid [22]. 
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As Howe points out in her submission, a potential advantage of this second test in the context of 
family violence is that it changes the focus to assessing the reasonableness of the woman’s 
response, rather than the grounds for her belief, in the circumstances that she perceived them to 
be.  
Similar provisions in Tasmania have highlighted aspects of this objective test grounded in the 
accused’s perceptions. For example, if the accused believes that a person is going to attack them 
and has a loaded pistol, evidence that the pistol was not loaded is not relevant to the test. The 
issue must be determined in the light of the circumstances as perceived by the accused.  
In the case of R v Walsh, Steer J of the Supreme Court of Tasmania said that: 
In this case, if the jury found that Mr Walsh believed that for some reason his friend was 
attacking him, then they would consider the surrounding circumstances, i.e. place, 
darkness, relative sizes of the two men, and as part of that process, take into account the 
fact that he was a war veteran who had been badly injured, and a man who had been 
severely injured following an attack by a group of youths. The jury may pay regard to the 
evidence that a person with the experiences of the accused would be more susceptible to 
fear of consequences and be more likely to perceive a necessity for immediate and drastic 
action.118 
Expert evidence could also be given, as provided for in section 9AH of the Crimes Act, concerning 
matters including the psychological effect of violence on people who have been in a relationship 
affected by family violence.   
The VLRC / NSW test does not render whether the accused had reasonable grounds for believing it 
was necessary to use the force used irrelevant. While not part of the test, the absence of 
reasonable grounds for a belief means that a person is less likely to have actually held the belief 
that it was necessary to act. Because this constitutes the second limb of the common law test, it is 
not necessary to explain this to a jury. However, because it is not part of the VLRC / NSW test, a 
judge will often need to explain to a jury that the absence of reasonable grounds means that a 
person is less likely to hold a belief that action is necessary. 
Self-defence in Canada 
The most recent changes to self-defence have occurred in Canada. In 2012, in the House of 
Commons, Mr Goguen MP, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice, discussed the new 
self-defence laws saying:   
The necessity to reform these defences stems from the fact that they are currently worded 
in an extremely complex and convoluted manner. In particular, our self-defence laws have 
been subject to decades of criticism by the judiciary, including the Supreme Court of 
Canada, trial counsel, criminal law academics, bar associations and the law reform bodies. 
Criticism has focused on the fact that the existing law is confusing and difficult to apply in 
practice. It is fair to say that the reform in this area is long overdue.119 
The Citizen’s Arrest and Self-defence Act 2012 (Can) sets out the three components of self-
defence: 
 a person must believe on reasonable grounds that force is being used against them 
 the act constituting the offence is committed for the purpose of defending themselves from 
that force, and 
 the act committed is reasonable in the circumstances. 
 
118 R v Walsh (1991) 60 A Crim R 419. 
119 Canada, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 24 April 2012, 1035. 
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The important difference with Canadian law when compared with tests in Australia is that the third 
element is fully objective in nature. It does not limit consideration of whether the act was reasonable 
to the circumstances as perceived by the accused. Where there are differences between the 
circumstances as the accused perceives them and as a reasonable person (independently) would 
perceive the circumstances, it will usually be easier for the prosecution to prove that the accused 
was not acting in self-defence. 
Limiting the objective assessment to the circumstances as perceived by the accused is particularly 
important in the context where a person kills in response to family violence. Given this difference, 
changing self-defence to the Canadian model would depart from all other jurisdictions in Australia 
and is not proposed by this paper.  
Conclusion 
The common law test for self-defence and the VLRC / NSW test substantially overlap. Accordingly, 
in most cases the result will be the same no matter which test is applied. A person who has 
reasonable grounds for believing it is necessary to defend themselves, and does so, will be 
responding in a way that is reasonable.   
The principal advantage with the common law test is that it has a recent history in Victoria for 
homicide offences and it is still used for non-homicide offences. It is relatively straightforward for 
judges and juries to apply.  
The principal advantages with the VLRC / NSW test is that it involves a (small) readjustment in 
focus to more objective features of whether a response was reasonable, in the circumstances as 
perceived by the person. This is probably closer to the kind of test that a juror would apply 
intuitively. The common law test sounds more like a test that lawyers would use. Further, it may 
make a small difference in cases involving violence by men against men, by virtue of the extent to 
which it focuses on objective features (the predominant kind of defensive homicide case).  
It is possible that the increased focus on objective features may also assist a woman who kills in 
response to family violence by shifting the focus from whether her belief was reasonable to whether 
her conduct was reasonable. 
It is possible that the VLRC / NSW test may also make a difference when men kill, by changing the 
focus to whether their response was reasonable in the circumstances as perceived by them. 
However, these changes are not likely to be substantial as the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
indicated that there are many similarities between the tests and as discussed in Part 2, a person 
acting in self-defence cannot ‘weigh to a nicety the exact measure of defensive action’.120  
Whichever test for self-defence is adopted, it would be essential that the test apply to all offences 
rather than have different tests for self-defence depending upon the offence charged, especially 
where both tests may need to be applied in the one trial. 
 
Question 1 – Self-defence 
Should the test for self-defence be that the accused believed that it was necessary to do 
what he or she did to defend himself, herself or another, and 
a) had reasonable grounds for that belief (the common law test), or 
b) the accused’s response was a reasonable response in the circumstances as perceived 
by the accused (the VLRC / NSW test)? 
                                                 
120 Palmer v The Queen [1971] AC 814, 832. 
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3.3 Should self-defence be codified or the common law reinstated? 
In Babic’s case, the Victorian Court of Appeal clarified that the Crimes (Homicide) Act abolished 
common law self-defence in relation to murder and manslaughter. Common law self-defence 
continues to apply to non-fatal offences such as causing injury and causing serious injury 
offences. 
Accordingly, whichever test for self-defence is introduced, it will be necessary to expressly state 
that test in the Crimes Act. The same test for self-defence should apply to fatal and non-fatal 
offences alike. Restoring the consistency in the laws of self-defence that existed prior to the 
2005 reforms will significantly:  
 simplify the trial judge’s task in explaining self-defence to the jury, and  
 assist the jury in understanding and applying self-defence.   
To ensure there is only one law of self-defence, it will also be necessary to expressly abolish the 
common law of self-defence wherever the statutory self-defence provisions apply. 
 
Proposal 4 – A consistent test for self-defence  
The department proposes that the test for self-defence should be set out in the Crimes Act 
1958 and should apply consistently to fatal and non-fatal offences. 
Proposal 5 – Abolition of the common law test for self-defence 
The department proposes that the common law test for self-defence be expressly 
abolished, wherever the new statutory test for self-defence applies. 
 
3.4 Self-defence and family violence provisions 
It is important that the test for self-defence does not affect the operation of other important 
changes introduced following the VLRC Report. Accordingly, the new test for self-defence 
(whichever test is chosen for the second limb) will still need to be linked to section 9AH of the 
Crimes Act which specifically applies to cases involving family violence. Section 9AH makes 
clear the types of evidence that are admissible in a family violence case and emphasises that a 
person may believe, and have reasonable grounds for believing, that their conduct is 
necessary:   
 where she or he is responding to a harm that is not immediate, and 
 where her or his response involves the use of force in excess of the force involved in the 
harm or threatened harm.121 
This provision is central to improvements to the way in which the law of self-defence operates in 
homicides which occur in the context of ongoing family violence. 
The VLRC indicated that its proposals concerning evidentiary laws were limited to the offences of 
murder and manslaughter because the terms of its reference were limited to homicide offences. 
However, the VLRC ‘urge[d] the Victorian Government to consider extending the operation of these 
provisions beyond the context of these two offences’.122 
                                                 
121 These aspects of self-defence are currently set out in s 9AH(1)(c) and (d) of the Crimes Act 1958. 
122 Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) 157. 
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The VLRC indicated that if the provisions were not extended to other offences, this would create 
anomalies when the issue of self-defence arose in relation to other offences where family violence 
evidence was relevant. A clear example would arise in relation to a charge of attempted murder or 
causing serious injury intentionally. These are serious offences where the maximum penalties are 
equal to or higher than the maximum penalty for manslaughter. The evidence that is relevant to a 
claim of self-defence should not depend simply upon whether a person dies or does not die as a 
result of the accused’s conduct.  
These evidentiary provisions are important and should be extended to other provisions where self-
defence arises. Greater use of social context evidence in relation to a number of offences should 
result in the legal profession and the courts: 
 being more familiar with the laws governing this kind of evidence, and 
 better understanding the ways in which this kind of evidence may be relevant. 
In turn, this should improve the effectiveness of social context evidence laws when used in 
homicide cases. 
 
Proposal 6 – Social context evidentiary laws 
The department proposes that the social context evidence laws contained in section 9AH 
of the Crimes Act 1958 be extended to apply to any claim of self-defence and not be limited 
to where the offence charged is murder or manslaughter.  
 
3.5 Draft provisions 
The following draft provisions give effect to Proposals 1 to 6 in legislative form, as amendments 
to the Crimes Act 1958. 
 
New Part IC (‘self defence’) inserted into Crimes Act 1958 
Section A(1):  Section 9AD of the Crimes Act 1958 is repealed. 
 
PART IC—SELF-DEFENCE 
322G Application of Part 
This Part applies to any offence, whether against any enactment or at common law. 
 
322H Onus of proof 
In any criminal proceeding in which self-defence is raised by the accused, the prosecution has the onus 
of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not carry out the conduct in self-defence. 
 
322I Self-defence 
1 A person is not guilty of an offence if the person carries out the conduct constituting the offence in 
self-defence. 
2 A person carries out conduct in self-defence if— 
a) the person believes the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another person; and 
b) the person has reasonable grounds for that belief. 
Note, See section 322K as to belief in circumstances where family violence is alleged. 
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New Part IC (‘self defence’) inserted into Crimes Act 1958 
[Alternative test] 
2    A person carries out conduct in self-defence if— 
a) the person believes the conduct is necessary to defend himself or herself or another person; and 
b) the conduct is a reasonable response in the circumstances as the person perceives them. 
 
322J Self-defence does not apply to a response to lawful conduct 
Section 322I does not apply if— 
a) the person is responding to lawful conduct; and 
b) at the time of his or her response, the person knows that the conduct is lawful. 
 
322K Family violence 
1 Without limiting section 322I, in circumstances where family violence is alleged, a person may 
believe, and may have reasonable grounds for believing, that his or her conduct is necessary to 
defend himself or herself or another person even if— 
a) he or she is responding to a harm that is not immediate; or 
b) his or her response involves the use of force in excess of the force involved in the harm or 
threatened harm. 
 
2 Without limiting the evidence that may be adduced, in circumstances where family violence is 
alleged, evidence of a kind referred to in subsection (3) may be relevant in determining whether— 
a) a person has carried out conduct while believing it to be necessary to defend himself or herself or 
another person; or 
b) a person has reasonable grounds for that belief. 
 
3 Evidence of— 
a) the history of the relationship between the person and a family member, including violence by the 
family member towards the person or by the person towards the family member or by the family 
member or the person in relation to any other family member; 
b) the cumulative effect, including psychological effect, on the person or a family member of that 
violence; 
c) social, cultural or economic factors that impact on the person or a family member who has been 
affected by family violence; 
d) the general nature and dynamics of relationships affected by family violence, including the 
possible consequences of separation from the abuser; 
e) the psychological effect of violence on people who are or have been in a relationship affected by 
family violence; 
f) social or economic factors that impact on people who are or have been in a relationship affected 
by family violence. 
 
4 In this section— 
child means a person who is under the age of 18 years; 
family member, in relation to a person, includes— 
a) a person who is or has been married to the person; or 
b) a person who has or has had an intimate personal relationship with the person; or 
c)  a person who is or has been the father, mother, step-father or step-mother of the person; or 
d) a child who normally or regularly resides with the person; or 
e) a guardian of the person; or 
f)   another person who is or has been ordinarily a member of the household of the person; 
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New Part IC (‘self defence’) inserted into Crimes Act 1958 
family violence, in relation to a person, means violence against that person by a family member; 
violence means— 
a) physical abuse; 
b) sexual abuse; 
c)  psychological abuse (which need not involve actual or threatened physical or sexual abuse), 
including but not limited to— 
i intimidation; 
ii harassment; 
iii damage to property; 
iv threats of physical abuse, sexual abuse or psychological abuse; 
v in relation to a child— 
(A) causing or allowing the child to see or hear the physical, sexual or psychological 
abuse of a person by a family member; or  
(B) putting the child, or allowing the child to be put, at real risk of seeing or hearing 
that abuse occurring. 
 
5 Without limiting the definition of violence in subsection (4)— 
a) a single act may amount to abuse for the purposes of that definition; 
b) a number of acts that form part of a pattern of behaviour may amount to abuse for that purpose, 
even though some or all of those acts, when viewed in isolation, may appear to be minor or trivial. 
… 
322M Abolition of self-defence at common law 
Self-defence at common law is abolished. 
 
Abolition of defensive homicide 
Proposed new section A(1) repeals the partial defence of defensive homicide in section 9AD of 
the Crimes Act 1958.  
Consequential references to defensive homicide in the Crimes Act and other Victorian statutes 
will also need to be removed.  
Self-defence  
Proposed new section 322G ensures that there is one test for self-defence, which will apply to 
all offences, whether the offence is in the Crimes Act 1958, or another Act or a common law 
offence. 
To ensure that there is only one law of self-defence, proposed new section 322M abolishes self-
defence at common law. This aims to avoid uncertainty similar to the confusion created with the 
introduction of defensive homicide regarding whether common law self-defence had been 
abolished, which was unresolved for five years until the decision in Babic’s case. 
Proposed new section 322G is in the same terms as common law self-defence and is intended 
to operate in the same way. At common law, self-defence applies to (among other things) 
conduct carried out in defence of property or to prevent unlawful deprivation of liberty.123 
Accordingly, it is unnecessary for section 322G to expressly specify that self-defence is 
available in these (and other) circumstances. In the department’s view, expanding upon the 
circumstances in which self-defence is available (which currently occurs in Victoria and some 
                                                 
123 See, e.g., the Judicial College of Victoria's Criminal Charge Book, which cites R v McKay [1957] VR 560, in which the 
Court of Appeal said that homicide is lawful if committed in reasonable self-defence of property. 
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other Australian jurisdictions) unnecessarily complicates the law and will make jury directions 
more complex. 
Further, as at common law, the proportionality of an accused’s response to the harm threatened 
will continue to be relevant under proposed new section 322G as a factor for the jury to take 
into account in determining whether the accused believed that his or her actions were 
necessary, and whether that belief was based on reasonable grounds. Following the common 
law, proportionality is not to be assessed by the jury as a separate consideration.  
Alternative second limb 
The draft provisions contain an alternative test for self-defence, which is based on the VLRC / 
NSW test for self-defence, as discussed in relation to Question 1. Like the common law 
approach to self-defence, this approach is intended to apply in a range of different situations 
including where a person is acting in reasonable defence of property or to prevent unlawful 
deprivation of liberty. As discussed in Part 3.2, this alternative test focuses on whether a 
person’s response was reasonable, rather than whether the person’s belief was reasonable.  
Family violence 
Section 9AH of the Crimes Act 1958 sets out the types of evidence that are admissible where 
family violence is raised in a charge of murder, manslaughter or defensive homicide. Proposed 
new section 322K extends section 9AH to all claims of self-defence (and is not limited to 
homicide offences). 
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4 Evidence about Homicide Victims 
4.1 Introduction 
In accordance with the VLRC Report’s recommendations, the Crimes (Homicide) Act inserted a 
new section 9AH(2) and (3) into the Crimes Act which highlights the kinds of relationship and social 
context evidence that may be relevant to help a jury understand the complexity of family violence 
and the realities faced by a woman who kills in response to family violence. 
Section 9AH(3) sets out the kinds of evidence that may be adduced in circumstances where family 
violence is alleged. This section provides that relevant evidence may be evidence of: 
 the history of the relationship between the accused person and a family member, including 
violence by the family member towards the accused person or by the accused person 
towards the family member or by the family member or the accused person in relation to 
any other family member 
 the cumulative effect, including psychological effect, on the accused person or a family 
member of that violence 
 social, cultural or economic factors that impact on the accused person or a family member 
who has been affected by family violence 
 the general nature and dynamics of relationships affected by family violence, including the 
possible consequences of separation from the abuser 
 the psychological effect of violence on people who are or have been in a relationship 
affected by family violence, and 
 social or economic factors that impact on people who are or have been in a relationship 
affected by family violence. 
Evidence that may be adduced as to the cumulative effect of violence can include expert evidence 
from psychologists and other professionals. Expert evidence may be relevant to both the objective 
and subjective elements of self-defence. Easteal has commented on the importance of allowing 
expert evidence to illustrate the cumulative effects of family violence:  
Without experts, jurors are left with their own preconceived notions of reasonable 
behaviour for a battered woman. Thus, the objective standard is worthless if the jury is not 
equipped to understand what is indeed reasonable behaviour for a woman who has 
experienced long-term battering.124 
Section 9AH of the Crimes Act implemented the VLRC’s recommendations to ensure that during 
homicide proceedings, the jury hears evidence of family violence and the impact of that violence. 
This evidence is essential for assisting juries to understand the realities of family violence and 
enabling them to appreciate how a person may believe that her or his actions are necessary in self-
defence, including where she or he is responding to a threat that is not immediate.  
In their comprehensive review of family violence, the ALRC and NSWLRC made the following 
recommendation in their Report Family Violence – A National Legal Response (2010): 
Recommendation 14–5 State and territory criminal legislation should provide guidance 
about the potential relevance of family-violence related evidence in the context of a 
defence to homicide. Section 9AH of the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) is an instructive model in 
this regard. 
 
124 Patricia Easteal, ‘Battered Women Who Kill: A Plea of Self-Defence’, Australian Institute of Criminology, cited in Andrew 
Hale, Corinne Borg and Paul McClure, ‘Battered Women’s Syndrome and Self-Defence’ (2006) 80(4) Law Institute Journal 
58, 61. 
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These laws are central to changing the law and culture of the criminal justice system. As discussed 
in Part 2, the cases of ‘SB’ and Freda Dimitrovski suggest that these social context evidence laws 
are having some positive impact. As discussed in Part 3, the department proposes that these laws 
be extended so that they are available wherever self-defence may be raised.  
In the light of the cases since the introduction of defensive homicide, it is also timely to consider 
whether there are other ways in which the laws of evidence could be improved in homicide cases. 
4.1.1 Summary of issue 
A major concern with the defence of provocation was its gender bias. Men claimed that they had 
killed their partner because they suspected infidelity or because she was threatening to leave the 
relationship and this amounted to provocation.  
However, even after the abolition of the defence of provocation, there may be homicide cases 
where sexual history evidence may be relevant. The Discussion Paper discusses these issues (at 
pages 56–7) and asked whether the sexual history evidence laws that apply to sexual offence 
cases should be adapted to apply in homicide cases. This would mean that such evidence would 
have to have ‘substantial relevance’ to a fact in issue and it must be in ‘the interests of justice’ to 
allow the questioning. 
The Discussion Paper (at pages 58–61) also discusses whether there should be changes to the 
laws governing relationship evidence. Relationship evidence may assist in explaining the context in 
which violence occurred.  
4.1.2 Submissions and consultations 
Sexual history evidence 
Most of the submissions that addressed this question supported adapting the laws that apply in 
sexual offence cases to homicide cases. As Ashton writes, ‘the sexual history of a female victim 
has historically been used to demean the character of the deceased and to mitigate or explain 
away the behaviour of the accused’. The submission from the Union of Australian Women also 
considers that specific safeguards are required given the underlying assumptions about male and 
female infidelity and gender bias common in society.  
On the other hand, some submissions do not consider that it is necessary to adapt the sexual 
history evidence laws to homicide cases. For example, VLA argues that the abolition of the 
provocation defence has greatly reduced the circumstances in which the deceased’s sexual history 
might be relevant, and that the current ‘relevance’ threshold is appropriate. The former DPP 
submitted that since the abolition of provocation, ‘[t]he sexual history of the victim of homicide is 
irrelevant and, to that extent, laws of evidence that apply in cases of sexual offences should not be 
adapted to apply in homicide’ cases.  
A number of submissions went beyond sexual history evidence to discuss concerns regarding the 
admissibility of evidence more generally. Ashton writes that: 
In rape cases, not allowing sexual history, affords the victim some protection from 
character assassination. However in homicide cases, sexual history is only one of many 
behaviours which may be called upon to demean the character of the victim. Historically it 
has been the easiest and most obvious trait for defence barristers to bring to the attention 
of the jury. I would suggest, that removing the tip of the iceberg, doesn’t remove the 
iceberg, and that there are a myriad of other behaviour traits which the defence will also 
use, should sexual history be excluded. So where would you draw the line... the woman 
may have had drug and alcohol issues, may have had children from various partners, may 
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have her parenting skills called into question, may have had mental health issues, might 
have been a liar, may have been a nag. So the issue is more about how to balance 
evidence which is relevant to the circumstances of the homicide with evidence which is 
purely demeaning of the deceased.  
Howe also writes that there should be a focus on what evidence is admitted and excluded in 
homicides involving family violence, including separation killings. Howe suggests that legislation 
should provide an express statement about evidence that is admissible (such as evidence 
concerning a well-founded fear of violence or previous serious assaults by the deceased) as well as 
evidence that is not admissible (such as evidence about infidelities, ‘mere words’ or insults, or once 
off, non-violent sexual advances). 
The joint submission by Tyson, Capper and Kirkwood also expresses concern that defensive 
homicide has ‘provided an avenue for men to use similar types of arguments in relation to their 
behaviour that occurred with the provocation defence’. 
Fitz-Gibbon writes that: 
A key concern of the previously abolished partial defence of provocation was that it 
provided a mechanism through which a victim of homicide could be blamed for their own 
death. It is a concern that similar narratives of victim blame are emerging through the 
operation of the offence of defensive homicide… [A]ny defence or offence…that allows the 
words or actions of the victim to be put on trial is problematic given the inability of a victim 
of homicide to contradict the version of events as given by the offender.  
Other submissions express the view that the law should protect the reputation of victims from 
inappropriate attack, particularly given that homicide victims cannot defend themselves in court. For 
example, the Crimes Victims Support Association writes that every care must be taken to prevent 
inappropriate or baseless attacks being made against the victim or victims. 
Relationship evidence 
The Discussion Paper (at pages 58–61) notes the current complexity of this area of the law, and 
that there are strong reasons for not changing the laws governing admissibility of relationship 
evidence in the context of only homicide cases.  
Many submissions do not address this issue. The former DPP and VLA did not support any 
changes to this area of the law. The former DPP indicated that an express legislative statement is 
unnecessary and should be avoided. VLA agrees that there are strong reasons for not changing the 
laws governing the admissibility of relationship evidence in homicide cases and considers that a 
legislative statement would not add any value. 
4.1.3 Conclusion 
The department agrees with the views expressed in a number of submissions that focusing on 
sexual history evidence is likely to be of limited benefit. There is a risk that specifically recognising 
this kind of evidence as potentially relevant in a homicide case may encourage its use and 
therefore be counterproductive. The department also agrees that the laws concerning relationship 
evidence should not be changed for the reasons expressed by the former DPP and VLA. 
The difficulty with these categories of evidence is that they primarily relate to excuses for conduct 
that recognise provocation or loss of self-control. The abolition of defensive homicide should build 
upon the abolition of provocation to further reduce the likelihood and strength of such claims.  
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However, even with the offence of manslaughter, similar kinds of issues arose in Sherna’s case, in 
which the accused was convicted of the manslaughter of his de facto partner Susanne Wild. 
Sherna’s counsel described the case to the jury as ‘entirely spontaneous. It was a sudden eruption 
as a result of the cumulative effect of many, many years of abuse’.125 Sherna said that Susanne had 
been: 
‘yelling and screaming’ about a mobile phone bill. Sherna described Susanne as ‘a mouth 
– really mouthy, none of the neighbours liked us at all. None of the neighbours would talk 
to us because she was always mouthing off at them… So for me, it was – just every day 
was a pressure-cooker day’.126        
The comments were such that the prosecution commented upon this in his closing address to the 
jury, as described by Tyson: 
If we consider that in his closing address to the jury in the Sherna case, the prosecuting 
counsel saw fit to comment on how the accused had either 'personally or through his 
counsel ... complained mercilessly about Susanne Wild'. He said the court had 'been 
absolutely awash with criticisms of her'. He intimated this was a tactic on the part of the 
accused and/or his lawyer, who deliberately sought to say ‘something, anything, however 
small, [but] negative about Susanne Wild'. Thus, the prosecuting counsel was critical that 
this had been 'quite a one-sided process'. While he conceded the practice of resorting to 
defence tactics that blame the victim was linked to the nature of the adversarial process, 
he said it was not one in which the victim was the one on 'trial as to her character'. This led 
him to conclude the process 'may have had a tendency to obscure the reality of what it 
actually was that this man did to his wife'.127  
As Sherna’s case shows, simply changing evidence laws in the context of sexual history would be 
insufficient. Accordingly, the department proposes changes to the laws of evidence which would 
have broader application in improving the way in which the law deals with evidence concerning the 
victim in a homicide case. As discussed above, a number of submissions indicated that something 
broader than bolstering restrictions on sexual history evidence laws is required.  
The proposed approach is aimed at protecting the rights and reputation of homicide victims, in a 
way that is consistent with the fair trial rights of the accused. It will also assist in providing balance 
to the evidence which is provided in court. The current system means that in some cases the 
accused has an unfair advantage in being able to present a picture of the victim. The department’s 
proposals aim to prevent inappropriate, unnecessary or unwarranted criticisms of the victim’s 
character and in some situations, permit the prosecution to lead evidence to rebut claims about the 
victim. 
The existence of such laws of evidence may: 
 discourage the accused from leading such evidence unless it is clearly relevant to their 
case, and 
 where the accused leads such evidence and it is disputed,128 enable the prosecution to 
rebut this evidence so that the jury is presented with all of the evidence to resolve these 
issues.   
While some jurisdictions exclude specific types of evidence (e.g. evidence of infidelities, or ‘mere’ 
words), this is in the context of a defence of provocation or loss of self-control. These evidentiary 
rules aim to limit use of these defences in situations which are not considered appropriate. Because 
 
125 DPP v Sherna [2009] VSC 494, trial transcript, Supreme Court of Victoria, 26–8, cited in Danielle Tyson, Sex, Culpability 
and the Defence of Provocation (2012) 135. 
126 Ibid 135. 
127 Danielle Tyson, Sex, Culpability and the Defence of Provocation (2012) 136−7. 
128 Such evidence may not be disputed, for instance, some aspects of Herman Rockefeller’s sexual history may have been 
relevant to the accuseds’ cases, if there had been a trial. By contrast, some evidence in the Ramage case may well have 
been disputed.  
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Victoria does not recognise the partial excuse of provocation, these approaches to excluding 
evidence are of limited value.  
4.2 Limits to questions about homicide victims 
The law already recognises that there are limits to questions that can be put to a witness. The court 
has a general power to control the conduct of proceedings, including control over the questioning of 
a witness.129 The court also has a specific power to stop cross-examination of a witness that is 
unduly annoying, harassing, intimidating, offensive, humiliating or oppressive.130 This extends to 
questioning a witness ‘in a manner or tone that is belittling, insulting or otherwise inappropriate’.  
The courts have observed that this power is consistent with the requirements of a fair trial, which: 
‘do not involve treating the criminal justice system as if it were a forensic game in which every 
accused is entitled to some kind of sporting chance’.131 
However, former DPP of the ACT, Richard Refshauge, says that judicial officers are sometimes 
reluctant to intervene to stop such cross-examination even when it is harassing.132 This is usually 
because the judge will not want to deny an accused an opportunity to show that they are not guilty 
of the offence charged. 
The purpose of these provisions is to balance the right, in an adversarial system, to test an 
opposing witness’s account against the distress experienced by a witness, or improper attacks on 
their character. If the victim is alive they are normally called as a witness and they are cross-
examined and accusations about their character need to be put to them. They have a chance to 
respond to comments about their character, tendencies and what they have or have not done.  
In homicide cases, the absence of the victim makes it easier for direct and indirect attacks about 
the victim. The lack of evidence from and about the victim can lead to a blank or very limited picture 
of the person that is then filled in by the evidence or impressions from the evidence. This is quite 
different from where a victim gives evidence and the jury can make their own assessment of the 
victim. 
The department proposes modifying laws about questions which can be put under cross-
examination under section 41 of the Evidence Act 2008.  
4.2.1 Application of possible reform 
The possible new power should apply to any criminal proceeding (which includes a committal 
hearing, trial and sentencing hearing) concerning a homicide offence. The issues arise in homicide 
cases because the victim is not able to give evidence.  
Section 41 of the Evidence Act is limited to cross-examination. The department proposes that 
improper questions not be asked, whether as evidence-in-chief, cross-examination or re-
examination. A broader approach is preferred because the issue is the nature of the information 
being sought rather than the nature of the question itself. 
 
129 Evidence Act 2008, ss11, 26. 
130 Ibid s 41. 
131 R v TA (2003) 57 NSWLR 444 [8], [13] (Spigelman CJ). 
132 Richard Refshauge, ‘The Prosecution Role in Upholding the Right to a Fair Trial and Responding to Victims/Witnesses’ 
(Paper presented at Victims Rights in a Human Rights Framework, National Forum on the 20th Anniversary of the UN 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime & Abuse of Power, Canberra, 21 December 2005). 
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4.2.2 Presumption that improper question cannot be asked 
Section 41 of the Evidence Act has two different approaches to improper questions. First, the court 
may disallow an improper question. This power is of general application. A specific power applies in 
relation to vulnerable witnesses. The department proposes that this special power should apply to 
improper questions about homicide victims.  
The analogy with vulnerable witnesses is appropriate given that homicide victims are not able to 
speak for themselves. The VLRC recommended the approach of prohibiting questions in relation to 
vulnerable witnesses under section 41 of the Evidence Act because it was ‘convinced that a 
specific duty in relation to vulnerable witnesses offers the best prospect of changing the culture of 
judicial non-intervention’.133 The same reasoning applies equally to homicide victims under this 
proposed new provision. 
The specific power for vulnerable witnesses provides a presumption that such questions be 
prohibited. However, like section 41(2) of the Evidence Act, it is proposed that the court may allow 
such questions if it is necessary to ask them in the interests of justice.  
In some instances, there may be a need to ask questions that are on the face of it improper in the 
interests of ensuring a fair trial. For instance, as the LIV points out: 
The recent case of R v Schembri & Anor illustrates that in some unusual cases, the sexual 
history of the victim is highly relevant, not to excuse or mitigate the actions of the accused, 
but to put the offending in context. In the Schembri case, the sexual history of the accused 
was relevant to the general background as to how the victim came to be in the presence of 
the accused, and afford the accused the opportunity to commit the offence.134 
While such exceptions are important and necessary, the presumption that improper questions are 
prohibited will assist in generating a different approach to such questions; normally, they should not 
be asked. 
4.2.3 What is an ‘improper’ question? 
The accused should not be able to ask questions about a homicide victim that they could not ask if 
the victim was alive. Further, some questions are inappropriate because they are disparaging or 
critical of the victim’s reputation or dignity. Other questions may be offensive or disrespectful if they 
were asked of the victim while the victim was alive.  
Accordingly, the department proposes that an improper question be defined as one that:   
 is offensive, humiliating or demeaning to the victim 
 treats the victim without respect or without respect for the victim’s reputation, or 
 has no basis other than a stereotype (e.g. a stereotype based on the victim's sex, race, 
culture, ethnicity, age or mental, intellectual or physical disability (when they were alive)). 
In determining these issues, the court would need to consider the issue from the perspective that 
the victim is alive and giving evidence in court. In this way, issues of being demeaning, offensive, 
treating the victim without respect or without respect for the victim’s reputation can be readily 
determined.   
 
133 Australian Law Reform Commission, Uniform Evidence Law, Report No 102 (2005) [5.123]. 
134 This case involved Mario Schembri and Bernadette Denny killing Herman Rockefeller. See R v Schembri & Anor [2010] 
VSC 402 and Hilary Bonney, The Double Life of Herman Rockefeller (2012).  
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This definition is adapted from the tests in section 41 of the Evidence Act. Some of the tests from 
that Act have been omitted because they relate specifically to a witness in court rather than 
questions about a victim (e.g. questions that are confusing).  
The test draws from principles of courtesy, respect and dignity for persons adversely affected by 
crime in the Victims’ Charter Act 2006, which reflects international standards dealing with the 
treatment of victims.135 The test also draws from United States’ state legislation which provides for 
constitutional protections for victims and treatment with respect, dignity and fairness.136 This 
definition would cover gratuitous questions about a homicide victim’s sexual history.  
As section 41(5) of the Evidence Act provides, it will also be important to specify that a question is 
not an improper question merely because: 
 the question challenges the truthfulness of the witness or the consistency or accuracy of 
any statement made by the witness about the victim, or 
 the question requires the witness to discuss a subject that could be considered distasteful 
to, or private by, the witness about the victim.           
This will clarify that it is the subject matter that may be improper rather than the fact that a person is 
being asked questions about a particular topic or subject matter. 
4.2.4 How would this provision work with social context evidence provisions? 
Some evidence which may be admitted under social context evidence, in the context of a woman 
who kills in response to family violence, will include questions that may be considered to be 
offensive, humiliating or treating the victim without respect, because they will often involve 
allegations of serious assaults including sexual assaults.  
The proposed restrictions will not prevent this kind of social context evidence from being adduced. 
This is because the questions will be necessary to ask as part of the issues the jury must determine 
in the case. However, for the avoidance of doubt, it is proposed that legislation specifically provide 
that this proposed new process does not limit the questions which may be asked, and evidence 
which may be adduced under section 9AH of the Crimes Act (the social context evidence 
provisions). 
4.2.5 The potential reform 
This potential reform will sometimes deal with sexual history evidence, but it is not limited to that 
kind of evidence. There are many kinds of offensive questions that could be asked in a case. This 
potential reform seeks to address the range of questions that could be asked by reference to the 
subject matter of the question more generally, and by reference to the effect of the question (e.g. 
that it is humiliating or treats the victim with a lack of respect). 
The department has not been able to find another jurisdiction that has developed this kind of 
approach. However, it involves an extension of established laws governing the questioning of 
witnesses. These potential reforms, like the established laws, are designed to strike an appropriate 
 
135 United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, 29 November 1985, UN 
Doc A/RES/40/34, article 6(b) which provides that victims ‘should be treated with compassion and respect for their dignity’. 
Also see European Union, Framework Decision on the Standing of Victims in the Criminal Proceedings in the Member 
States of the European Union (2001) article 2(1) requiring member states to ensure that ‘victims are treated with due 
respect for the dignity of the individual during proceedings’. 
136 Crimes Victims Rights Act of 2004 18 USC § 3771 providing that a crime victim has the ‘right to be treated with fairness 
and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy’. 
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balance between the ability of a person to conduct their defence and ensuring that the proceeding 
is conducted fairly and with respect to the interests of the victim and their family. 
It may also prevent the accused from gaining an unfair advantage in that they can ask questions of 
witnesses about the victim (deceased) that they could not ask of the victim in an attempted murder 
charge where the victim is called to give evidence.   
 
Question 2 – Improper questions about homicide victims 
Should new evidence laws be introduced to prohibit questions in a homicide case about the 
victim (unless necessary in the interests of justice) where, if the victim was alive and giving 
evidence in court, the question would: 
 be offensive, humiliating or demeaning to the victim 
 treat the victim without respect  
 fail to respect the victim’s reputation, or 
 have no basis other than a stereotype (e.g. a stereotype based on the victim's 
sex, race, culture, ethnicity, age or mental, intellectual or physical disability)? 
 
4.3 Evidence in rebuttal about homicide victims 
What the discussion of the Middendorp and Sherna decisions has also shown is 
that the characters of dead women who have been killed by their intimate 
partners or ex-partners are still being put on trial.137 
While the above potential reform would limit improper questions, such questions would still be 
permissible where they are necessary to enable the accused to properly conduct his or her 
defence. Where this occurs, a further problem concerns the restrictions on the prosecution from 
leading evidence which may counteract this evidence or provide a more complete picture to the 
jury. 
In the absence of the victim being able to respond as a witness, the department proposes 
modification of the laws regulating character evidence to allow the prosecution to adduce evidence 
in rebuttal about the victim’s character.  
4.3.1 Can evidence about a homicide victim’s character be admitted as 
character evidence? 
Character evidence concerns a person’s inherent moral qualities or disposition. The Evidence Act 
regulates the admission of evidence about an accused’s character, and the character of others, 
including victims and witnesses. A number of provisions regulate character evidence.  
Character evidence about a victim must first be relevant and must also be admissible under the 
rules governing hearsay, opinion, tendency, coincidence and credibility evidence.  
Character evidence about the accused’s bad character must meet these same tests and some 
further protections. These protections operate as additional exclusionary rules applying to evidence 
about the accused, and aim to prevent the admission of unduly prejudicial evidence. For example, 
                                                 
137 Danielle Tyson, Sex, Culpability and the Defence of Provocation (2012) 140. 
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additional rules apply to tendency or coincidence evidence adduced by the prosecution about the 
accused.  
However, different rules apply where the defence adduces evidence of the accused’s ‘good 
character’. In this situation, the accused’s evidence does not have to comply with the rules of 
hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility.138 The defence can use this evidence to show that: 
 the accused is less likely to have committed an offence (tendency reasoning), and 
 it is more likely that the accused’s evidence is credible (credibility evidence). 
If the accused chooses to adduce good character evidence, it acts as a trigger for the prosecution 
or a co-accused to adduce evidence in rebuttal to show that the accused is not a person of good 
character.139 The rules of hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility evidence do not apply to 
evidence adduced in rebuttal. Consequently, while the exclusion of these rules in relation to 
evidence of an accused’s good character is of benefit to the accused, the trade-off is that it may 
allow the prosecution or a co-accused to adduce evidence of ‘bad character’ that may otherwise 
have been excluded.  
However, the trade-off is not completely equal, as a number of further protections apply to the 
accused: 
 The use to which evidence of bad character may be put is more limited than good 
character evidence. Bad character evidence can only be used to rebut evidence of good 
character (that is, to assess an accused’s credibility). It cannot be used to infer guilt (that is, 
to support tendency reasoning).140 
 An accused must not be cross-examined about character evidence unless the court gives 
leave to do so (s 112). Further restrictions may apply to cross-examining an accused about 
credibility evidence (s 104).141 
 Evidence of bad character may be limited or excluded under the discretionary and 
mandatory exclusions in Part 3.11. In particular, section 137 provides that ‘the court must 
refuse to admit evidence adduced by the prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice to the accused’. 
The Evidence Act does not include an equivalent Part regulating the admission of evidence of a 
homicide victim’s good character to rebut any allegations of bad character the accused may make. 
In the absence of the victim appearing as a witness, the opportunity to introduce evidence of good 
character may be limited by other rules of evidence, such as relevance and the hearsay, credibility 
and opinion rules. 
4.3.2 Can the prosecution challenge the credibility of evidence attacking a 
homicide victim’s character? 
Character evidence is linked to the assessment of the credibility of a witness. As noted above, one 
of the permitted uses for evidence of good or bad character in Part 3.8 is to show that the evidence 
of the accused is more or less likely to be credible. 
 
138 Evidence Act 2008  s 110(1). 
139 Ibid s 110(2), (3). 
140 This is the approach at common law, which the New South Wales Court of Appeal has applied to the Uniform Evidence 
Act. The Victorian Criminal Charge Book directs judges to follow the New South Wales approach. However, the issue of 
tendency reasoning in relation to evidence of ‘bad character’ is not settled in Victoria. 
141 There is some debate about the intersection between the rules in Part 3.7 concerning cross-examination of an accused on 
matters relevant to the assessment of credibility (s 104) and the rules in Part 3.8 concerning character evidence. This is 
because section 110 only exempts character evidence from the application of the ‘credibility rule’ in section 102, but does 
not refer to the further protections for the accused in section 104. See the discussion in: Stephen Odgers SC, Uniform 
Evidence Law (10th ed, 2012) [1.3.9160] and Jeremy Gans and Andrew Palmer, Uniform Evidence (2010) 245. 
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Part 3.7 of the Evidence Act regulates the admission of credibility evidence. The credibility rule 
provides that ‘[c]redibility evidence about a witness is not admissible’. Evidence used to assess 
credibility is subject to the credibility rule if it falls within the definition of ‘credibility evidence’.142 
‘Credibility evidence’ is evidence relevant to the credibility of a witness or another person that is 
only relevant because: 
 it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person, or 
 it affects the assessment of the credibility of the witness or person and is also relevant for 
another purpose for which it is not admissible under Parts 3.2 to 3.6 of the Evidence Act.143 
Therefore, the credibility rule does not apply to evidence that is relevant to credibility if that 
evidence is also relevant and admissible for another purpose. In this situation, the evidence may be 
used to assess credibility, as well as being used for the other admissible purpose. 
The credibility rule is subject to a number of exceptions set out in Part 3.7. These exceptions 
provide only limited scope for the admission of evidence in rebuttal about a homicide victim’s 
character. Depending on the circumstances of a particular case, evidence of a victim’s good 
character adduced to challenge the credibility of evidence adverse to the victim may fall within the 
following exceptions: 
 evidence which is relevant to both credibility and for another purpose for which it is 
admissible144 
 evidence adduced in cross-examination of an accused or another witness if the evidence 
could substantially affect the assessment of the accused or other witness’s credibility145  
 evidence to rebut denials of, or a failure to admit or agree to, evidence about the victim put 
to a witness in cross-examination,146 and 
 evidence that either discredits a previous negative representation about a victim made by 
the accused or another person, or that supports the credibility of a previous positive 
representation made by or about the victim.147 
The restrictions that apply to the use of credibility evidence in these circumstances are significant 
hurdles to the admission of evidence concerning the victim’s good character. Admission of such 
evidence is also subject to other rules of evidence that may render the evidence inadmissible, such 
as the hearsay and opinion rules. These are significant impediments when the victim is not able to 
be called as a witness. Unlike the character evidence provisions in Part 3.8, discussed above, the 
exceptions to the credibility rule do not exempt the evidence from most other rules of evidence.148 
The discretionary and mandatory exclusion provisions in Part 3.11 may also limit or exclude the 
admission of credibility evidence. 
4.3.3 Evidence of the homicide victim’s character may be adduced in rebuttal 
To enable the prosecution to adduce evidence of a homicide victim’s good character in rebuttal, the 
department considers that the character evidence provisions in Part 3.8 are the most appropriate 
focus for reform. 
 
142 Evidence Act 2008 s 102. 
143 Ibid s 101A. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid s 103. Cross-examination of the accused on matters concerning credibility is subject to further restrictions (s 104). 
These restrictions significantly narrow the scope for the prosecution to challenge the accused in cross-examination about 
evidence concerning the victim’s character. 
146 Ibid s 106. The restrictions on cross-examining an accused on matters concerning credibility noted above limit the extent 
to which the prosecution may put such matters to an accused. 
147 Ibid s 108A. 
148 The rules on tendency and coincidence in Part 3.6 do not apply to evidence that relates only to the credibility of a witness: 
Evidence Act 2008 s 94(1). 
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Expanding the application of Part 3.8 beyond the character of the accused is a significant step. Part 
3.8 provides an accused with an opportunity to introduce evidence of good character that may 
otherwise be inadmissible. It places the onus on the accused to determine whether to put his or her 
character in issue. The accused’s right to adduce this evidence is balanced against the prosecution 
or co-accused’s right to adduce evidence in rebuttal that may otherwise be inadmissible.  
The balancing approach in Part 3.8 reflects the broader balancing approach of the rules of 
evidence that weigh probative value against prejudicial effect to ensure a fair trial. Any amendment 
to Part 3.8 to enable the admission of evidence about the victim’s character must maintain an 
appropriate balance between probative value and prejudicial effect.   
The department’s proposed reforms will work in a similar way to the existing provisions in Part 3.8. 
Currently, the defence may adduce evidence about the victim’s character generally or in a 
particular respect, if it passes the threshold test of relevance. Under the department’s potential 
reforms, this evidence would remain subject to all rules of evidence, including the rules governing 
hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility evidence, and to the proposed limit on improper 
questions. The continued application of these rules to this evidence is in contrast to the treatment of 
good character evidence about the accused under section 110(1). This difference is appropriate 
because the reforms should not increase the scope for the defence to introduce evidence about the 
victim’s character. 
The department proposes to reform Part 3.8 as follows:  
 If the accused introduces evidence to show that a homicide victim was not a person of 
good character, the prosecution may adduce evidence about the victim to show that the 
victim was a person of good character, either generally or in a particular respect.  
 The rules of hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility evidence will not apply to this 
evidence.  
 The prosecution may not use the evidence to infer guilt (tendency reasoning). 
The proposed exemption is consistent with the approach taken to evidence in rebuttal in sections 
110(2) and 110(3). The rules of hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility evidence should not 
apply to this evidence because the victim is unable to give evidence in person. 
The prosecution may use this evidence in different ways. For instance, it may rely on the evidence: 
 to show that the accused’s evidence about the victim’s character is less likely to be credible, or 
 to explain, qualify or contradict the accused’s evidence about the victim’s character. 
The department considers that this proposed reform will deter the defence from introducing 
evidence attacking a victim’s character unless it has real probative value for the defence. If it has 
real probative value then this is relevant to the issues that the jury must determine. 
To maintain the accused’s right to a fair trial, existing safeguards will apply to the admission of 
evidence of the victim’s good character. These include: 
 the requirement that the court give leave to cross-examine the accused about matters 
arising from character evidence149 
 the discretionary and mandatory exclusions in Part 3.11, particularly section 137, and 
 the limitations on the way in which the evidence may be used. 
 
149 Ibid s 112.  
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It may be argued that there is a risk that if the Evidence Act provides a formal mechanism for 
adducing evidence in rebuttal about a homicide victim’s character, the trial may become a trial of 
the victim’s character, rather than a trial focused on the alleged actions of the accused. However, if 
the accused introduces evidence of the victim’s character, the focus of the trial may shift to the 
victim’s character anyway, and in an unbalanced way.  
The department anticipates that the proposed reforms concerning improper questions will limit the 
instances in which evidence adverse to the victim’s character is adduced at trial. The proposed 
reforms to character evidence should act as a further deterrent in cases in which the defence may 
otherwise attempt to inappropriately direct blame towards the victim, because the accused’s 
evidence may be effectively challenged and countered. Consequently, the reforms should assist in 
maintaining the focus of the trial on the alleged actions of the accused rather than on the victim’s 
character. 
4.3.4 Should the credibility rule be reformed? 
Another approach would be to modify the exceptions to the credibility rule in Part 3.7 to allow the 
prosecution to adduce evidence of the victim’s character in rebuttal. However, the difficulty with this 
approach is that the current exceptions to the credibility rule operate as exceptions to that rule only. 
The exceptions do not exempt the evidence from the application of other exclusionary rules, such 
as hearsay. These rules may capture evidence about the victim’s character, particularly as the 
victim is unable to give evidence in person.  
This issue could be addressed by amending the exceptions to the credibility rule so that if an 
exception applies, the evidence would also be exempt from the application of other exclusionary 
rules (similar to the character evidence provisions in Part 3.8). However, extending the operation of 
the exceptions to the credibility rule in this way is unwarranted and would apply to far more 
evidence than intended.  
A single specific exception targeted at credibility evidence about the character of homicide victims 
could be created to which other rules of evidence, such as hearsay, do not apply. It is arguable that 
a specific exception is appropriate because unlike most other victims or witnesses, homicide 
victims are not able to respond in person and these exclusionary rules often block evidence about 
them from other people. However, given that no other exceptions to the credibility rule exempt the 
application of other rules of evidence, this possible reform does not fit well within the scheme of the 
credibility rule. 
Further, the issue of the victim’s character is not simply about the accused’s credibility. It concerns 
the victim, how he or she is portrayed in court, and providing the jury with relevant evidence to 
determine the issues in dispute. As discussed above, the victim’s absence in homicide cases may 
provide increased scope to demean the victim’s reputation. Such attacks may be inappropriate and 
without foundation. It can have the effect of shifting the blame for the victim’s death onto the victim. 
It may be used to evoke sympathy for the accused or to support their account of the circumstances 
of the alleged offence.  
The potential reforms to limit improper questions about a victim aims to protect the victim’s 
character from inappropriate attack when the victim is unable to respond in person. Reforms to the 
credibility rule would only address one aspect of attacks on the victim’s character by focusing on 
the accused’s credibility, rather than directly restoring the victim’s reputation. Given these concerns, 
the department does not propose any amendment to the credibility rule. 
                                  Defensive Homicide 
 
                                                    59 
   
 
4.3.5 The potential reform 
Currently, the opportunities for the prosecution to adduce evidence about a homicide victim’s 
character to rebut attacks by the defence are limited. In the absence of the victim, the defence is 
able to portray the victim in a negative way, and engage in victim blaming. 
The department proposes to amend the character evidence provisions in Part 3.8 of the Evidence 
Act to redress the current imbalance. The proposed reforms will operate in a similar way to the 
existing provisions, but rather than focusing on the accused’s character, will instead focus on the 
victim’s character. Existing safeguards, together with the limits on the use to which evidence of the 
victim’s good character may be put, will maintain the right to a fair trial.  
The proposed reforms to character evidence will operate in tandem with the proposed limits on 
improper questions. The latter will act as an initial hurdle to prevent the admission of evidence 
which is adverse to a homicide victim, unless the questions are necessary given the issues in the 
case. If such evidence is admitted, the proposed reforms to character evidence will enable the 
prosecution to challenge the credibility of that evidence by introducing evidence in rebuttal about 
the victim’s character. This reform will help to redress the imbalance that currently exists because 
homicide victims are unable to respond in person to character attacks. 
These reforms will be particularly important in homicides involving intimate partners. As discussed 
in Part 2 of this paper, men commit 88% of all homicides and women comprise 32% of all victims of 
homicides. This evidence will be primarily relevant in cases where men kill.  
If, for example, a woman is charged with murder and wishes to lead social context evidence (under 
section 9AH of the Crimes Act), this evidence will often show that the victim was not a person of 
good character. The prosecution may already call evidence to show that the victim was of good 
character if it has evidence which differs from the accused’s evidence. The proposed new provision 
would not provide any limit on the social context evidence which the accused could adduce. 
This evidence will primarily assist in cases where the accused and victim are (or have recently 
been) intimate partners. It is possible that, in a case where women kill in response to family 
violence, it might slightly increase the prosecution’s ability to adduce evidence that differs from the 
accused’s evidence. However, if it did, it would be because there is evidence of that nature that is 
available. This is consistent with the purpose of the reforms, namely, to make trials fairer.   
 
Question 3 – Evidence in rebuttal about homicide victims 
Should new evidence laws be introduced to provide that in a criminal proceeding for a 
homicide offence, if the accused introduces evidence to show that the victim was not a 
person of good character, either generally or in a particular respect, the prosecution: 
 may adduce evidence about the victim to show that the victim was a person 
of good character, either generally or in a particular respect, but 
 may not use the evidence to infer guilt (tendency reasoning)? 
The rules governing hearsay, opinion, tendency and credibility evidence would not apply to 
this evidence.  
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4.4 Draft provisions 
To facilitate consideration of Questions 2 and 3 above, possible draft provisions for inclusion in the 
Evidence Act 2008 are set out below. 
Proposed new section 41A provides that the court must disallow an ‘improper question’ about the 
victim of a homicide offence unless the court is satisfied that the question is necessary.  
The draft provisions define ‘homicide offence’ broadly to include any offence where causing the 
death of another person is an element of the offence. The draft definition of ‘improper question’ 
draws on section 41(3) of the Evidence Act and provides that the court must consider the issue as if 
the victim were alive and giving evidence in court. In this way, issues of being demeaning, 
offensive, treating the victim without respect or without respect for the victim’s reputation can be 
more readily determined (as discussed above).   
Proposed new section 112A sets out circumstances in which the prosecution can adduce good 
character evidence about the victim of a homicide offence. 
 
New sections inserted into the Evidence Act 2008 
41A Improper questions about victim of homicide offence 
1 In this section— 
homicide offence means any offence where causing the death of another person is an element of 
the offence and includes— 
a) murder contrary to common law; 
b) manslaughter contrary to common law; 
c)  an offence against section 3A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Unintentional killing in the course or 
furtherance of a crime of violence); 
d) an offence against section 5A of the Crimes Act 1958 (Child homicide); 
e) an offence against section 318 of the Crimes Act 1958 (Culpable driving causing death); 
f)   an offence against section 319(1) of the Crimes Act 1958 (Dangerous driving causing death); 
 
improper question means a question about the victim of a homicide offence that— 
a) is offensive, humiliating or demeaning about the victim; or 
b) treats the victim without respect; or 
c)  fails to respect the reputation of the victim; or 
d) has no basis other than a stereotype (for example, a stereotype based on the victim’s sex, 
race, culture, ethnicity, age or mental, intellectual or physical disability) 
or would be if the victim were alive and giving evidence in court. 
 
2 In a criminal proceeding in respect of a homicide offence, the court must disallow an improper 
question put to a witness unless the court is satisfied that, in all the relevant circumstances of the 
case, it is necessary for the question to be put. 
 
3 A question is not an improper question merely because— 
a) the question challenges the truthfulness of the witness or the consistency or accuracy of any 
statement made by the witness about the victim; or 
b) the question requires the witness to discuss a subject about the victim that could be considered 
distasteful to, or private by, the witness. 
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New sections inserted into the Evidence Act 2008 
4 This section applies to a question put during evidence-in-chief, cross-examination or re-
examination. 
 
112A Evidence about character of victim of homicide offence 
1 In this section homicide offence has the same meaning as in section 41A. 
 
2 In a criminal proceeding in respect of a homicide offence, if the accused adduces evidence to show 
that the victim of the homicide offence was not a person of good character, either generally or in a 
particular respect, the prosecution— 
a) may adduce evidence about the victim to show that the victim was a person of good character, 
either generally or in a particular respect; and 
b) must not use that evidence to infer guilt. 
 
3 The hearsay rule, the opinion rule, the tendency rule and the credibility rule do not apply to 
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5 Monitoring and reviewing 
The department described the Discussion Paper as the first step in the review of defensive 
homicide. This Consultation Paper provides a further opportunity to consider the operation of 
defensive homicide and related issues after more than seven and a half years of operation. 
Victoria has progressed reform of homicide laws further than other Australian jurisdictions by 
abolishing provocation and specifying that in the context of family violence, a person may be acting 
in self-defence even if she or he is responding to a harm that is not immediate or uses force in 
excess of the force used in the harm or threatened harm. Victoria also has social context evidence 
provisions to assist the jury in understanding how family violence is relevant to self-defence. 
The proposals in this paper involve further significant reforms. While this review has focused 
primarily on defensive homicide, we have also examined self-defence more generally and victim 
blaming (through evidence laws). If the department’s proposals (as informed by comments on this 
paper) are enacted by the government, they should be reviewed to see if they achieve the intended 
outcomes.  
As discussed in this paper, generating cultural change is essential for reforms to work. Change can 
be difficult to achieve. One way of promoting cultural change is to continue the review of our laws, 
practices, attitudes and knowledge in homicide cases.  
The VLRC recommended that the department review the operation of excessive self-defence five 
years after its commencement. This was an appropriate time frame for reviewing this significant 
change.  
If the government introduces further changes in this area, the department proposes that any new 
laws be reviewed five years after their commencement.  
 
Proposal 7 – Review of the operation of reforms 
The department proposes that there be a review of the operation of reforms arising from 
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Coalition for Safer Communities 
5 Ms Allie Dawe Union of Australian Women – Victorian Branch 
6 Ms Kate Fitz-Gibbon Department of Criminology 
School of Political and Social Inquiry 
Monash University 
7 Ms Brigid Foster Law Institute of Victoria 
8 Ms Julia Gibby School of Law 
La Trobe University 
9 Mr Saul Holt Director, Criminal Law Services 
Victoria Legal Aid 
10 Micki Horton  




12 Ms Marilyn McMahon School of Law 
Latrobe University 
13 Mr Steve Medcraft President 
People Against Lenient Sentencing 
14 Associate Professor 
Sharon Pickering 
Dr JaneMaree Maher 
 
Dr Marie Segrave 
Head, Criminology, Monash University 
 
Director, Centre for Women’s Studies and Gender 
Research, Monash University  
Senior Lecturer, Criminology, Monash University 
15 Mr Phillip Priest QC Former member of the Victorian Bar 
16 Mr Jeremy Rapke QC Director of Public Prosecutions 
Victoria (former) 
17 Dr Danielle Tyson 
Sarah Capper 
Dr Debbie Kirkwood 
On behalf of: Dr Tyson, the Victorian Women’s 
Trust, the Domestic Violence Resource Centre 
Victoria, Domestic Violence Victoria, the 
Federation of Community Legal Centres, Koorie 
Women Mean Business and Women’s Health 
Victoria 
18 Associate Professor John 
Willis 
School of Law 
La Trobe University 
19 Mr David Woods  
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Offence – what induced fear 


















None, attended same 




Conflict at gathering. Victim left and 
returned in aggressive state. Fight 
ensued and offender stabbed victim. 
Victim was also using knife against 
offender. 
Offender intoxicated and drug 
affected at time of offence. 
Offender had substance abuse 
problems for many years. 
Number of prior convictions for 
violence. 
Plea 7 years 
imprisonment 




guilty plea not 
specified. 













Partner of victim was 
former partner of 
offender. Offender and 











Victim initially threatened to hit 
offender with table leg.  
Note: offender’s attack continued 
after victim unconscious and 
occurred in presence of offender’s 
son and victim’s partner.  
Trial Judge described 
offender’s criminal history as 
‘shocking’ – 23 of 28 years of 
his adult life spent in custody. 
Plea 9.5 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
7.5 years [but for 
guilty plea, 10 
years and non-









Both in custody in the 
Scarborough North Unit, 





Offender entered victim’s cell, fight 
ensued (offender said at victim’s 
instigation) and offender stabbed 
victim.  
Significant criminal history (113 
prior convictions, only 1 for 
unlawful assault). 
Plea 8 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
6 years 
[but for guilty 
plea, 9 years 
imprisonment and 
non-parole of 7 
years]. 









Offender and victim had 





Fight between victim and offender. 
Offender said victim threatened him 
and said he was gay. 
 
Offender had deteriorating 
mental state due to drug use. 
Was diagnosed with drug 
induced psychosis (2 prior 
offences relating to drug use) 
Plea 7 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
4.5 years 
(sentenced as 
youthful offender).  
Note: sentence 
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Offence – what induced fear 
of death/serious injury 








guilty plea not 
specified. 








Acquaintances of 20 
years. Offender was 
friends with victim’s 
brothers. 
Knife-stabbing 
(3 stab wounds 
to chest) 
Offender owed victim $2000 for the 
drug ice.  
Offender was armed with knife and 
tried to steal ice from victim. Victim 
woke during robbery. Offender 
thought victim was getting gun 
(knew victim owned semi-automatic 
weapon) and stabbed victim. 
Ward of State from age 10–11. 
Addicted to ice, large number of 
prior convictions (91) including 
intentionally causing injury and 
recklessly causing injury. 
Plea 9 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
7 years 
[but for guilty 
plea, 11 years 
imprisonment and 
non-parole of 9 
years]. 
















Fight between offender and victim 
(unarmed). Victim confronted 
offender and threw first punch, 
offender stabbed and punched 
victim. Fight continued.  
Offender had been using drugs 
prior to offence (had used 
drugs since 12 years old).  
Troubled upbringing (father 
convicted of double murder, 
subjected to and witnessed 
violence, placed in state care). 
Had a number of prior 
convictions (3 for violence). 
Plea 8.5 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
5.6 years 
[but for guilty 
plea, 10 years 
imprisonment and 
non-parole of 7 
years]. 








Friends through a 





almost all parts 
of body) 
Several inconsistent versions of 
events provided by offender.  
Sentencing judge noted offender 
should be sentenced on basis that 
victim did not do anything of 
substance that merited attack, but 
that in offender’s alcohol fuelled 
state he had reasoned that he was 
under threat. 
Highly intoxicated at time of 
offence.  
Very difficult upbringing, very 
low IQ (76). Diagnosed as 
suffering chronic adjustment 
disorder with mixed disturbance 
of emotions and conduct. 
Plea 8 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
4 years [but for 
guilty plea, 10 
years and non-
parole of 6]. 






(likely in 60s) 
Victim was uncle of 
offender 
Baseball bat 
used to beat 
victim, also 
punching.  
Altercation between victim and 
offender. Victim threatened to treat 
offender’s children in same way he 
had treated offender (this was a 
reference to fact the victim had 
Offender had been subjected to 
sexual abused by victim during 
his childhood. 
Offender had 5 prior 
convictions (1 for unlawful 
Plea 7 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
4 years and 9 
months [but for 
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Offence – what induced fear 
of death/serious injury 







sexually abused offender when he 
was aged 8–14 ). 
assault and 1 for breaching an 
intervention order, others relate 
to driving). 
guilty plea, 9 
years and non-
parole of 7]. 







Victim known to 
offender. Victim lived in 
same boarding house 
as a friend of the 




Victim struck offender earlier in day 
causing offender to bleed profusely. 
Offender returned to boarding 
house later in day to confront the 
victim. Victim produced knife which 
offender wrestled from victim and 
subsequently stabbed victim 
repeatedly in the course of a 
wrestle. 
Offender was highly intoxicated 
at time of offence. Suffered 
severe drug and alcohol 
addiction and diagnosed as 
paranoid schizophrenic.  
Number of prior convictions and 
at the time of the offence was 
on, or had just completed, a 
Community Based Order. 
Plea 10 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
7 years 
[but for guilty 
plea, 12 years 
imprisonment and 





v The Queen 
[2011] VSCA 12 








Victim known to 






Fight ensued between offender and 
victim. Victim was stabbed with 
kitchen knife.  
No account given by offender to 
police but made admissions to 
others that he had stabbed following 
attack from victim. 
History of serious drug use 
(chronic poly-drug user), large 
number of prior convictions 
(including for violent offences). 
Verdict  10 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
8 years. 
 













Offenders loosely knew 
victim (from the same 
regional community).  
Garden stake 
used to beat 
victim 
Victim produced knife and belt (as 
weapon) in response to comment 
from offender. Croxford reacted and 
fight ensued between victim and 
Croxford and Doubleday attempted 
to break up fight. Croxford and 
Doubleday armed themselves with 
garden stakes as weapons.  
Croxford, Doubleday and victim 
fought. Victim approached Croxford 
and Doubleday with knife, Croxford 
struck victim with garden stake, 
Offender had addiction to 
cannabis and was affected by 
alcohol at time of offence. 
Prior convictions dating back to 
when he was 16 (none of which 
involved violent offending). 
Verdict 9 years 
imprisonment 
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Offence – what induced fear 
of death/serious injury 







Doubleday subsequently struck 
victim again and killed him. 







Victim known to 
offender, lived next door 




injury to chest) 
Confrontation between victim and 
offender in relation to money and 
stolen goods. Victim punched 
offender in face, offender retaliated. 
Fight ensued and offender stabbed 
victim and punched him.  
Significant number of prior 
convictions, including a number 
that relate to causing injury. 
Has a history of serious drug 
and alcohol abuse. 
Plea 10 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
7 years 
[but for guilty 
plea, 11.5 years 
imprisonment and 










Offender and victim 
were in relationship and 




(4 stab wounds 
to back) 
Victim arrived at the house she 
shared with offender in Brunswick 
with a male companion. Offender 
was armed with a knife and chased 
male companion away. Offender 
said that victim came at him with 
knife and, in the struggle that 
ensued, offender stabbed the victim 




Offender was affected by 
alcohol at time of offence. 
Troubled upbringing with 
history of drug abuse and a 
number of prior convictions.  
Evidence was led at trial as to 
the violent nature of the 
relationship between the victim 
and the offender. 
At time of victim’s death the 
offender was under a Family 
Violence Order (requiring 
offender not to assault, harass, 
threaten or intimidate victim). 
Verdict 12 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole 
period of 8 years 















m by gender: 
Relationships – family v 
non family:  
Weapon type:  
 







M:13, F: 0  
Victim 
M:12, F:1 
Family – 2 (R v Spark: 
victim was uncle of 
offender; R v 
Middendorp: victim was 
girlfriend of offender) 
Non-family – 11 
Knife – 10 
Other – 3 
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Offence – what induced fear 

















Offender was the de-
facto partner of the 
victim.  
Knife-stabbing 
(2 stab wounds 
to the chest) 
 
Offender and victim had an 
argument and victim was verbally 
harassing offender and acting in a 
physically intimidating manner. 
Offender grabbed knife and stabbed 
victim.  
Offender had been subject to long 
term family violence by victim. 
 
Moderate depression, mild 
anxiety.  No prior convictions. 
Plea 9 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
6 years [but for 
guilty plea, 11 
years and non-





v The Queen 
[2012] VSCA 75 




male, 58  
Victim: male, 
over 55 (age 
not specified) 
Offender and victim 





Offender was tripped by victim 
causing offender to stumble (but not 
fall). Offender immediately produced 
knife and stabbed victim repeatedly. 
Long term psychiatric illness 
(paranoid schizophrenia).  
 
Past criminal history of violent 
crimes (2 prior convictions).  
Plea 10.5 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
7 years and 6 
months 
[but for guilty 
plea, 12 years 
imprisonment and 
non-parole of 9 
years and 6 
months]. 













stab wound to 
the abdomen) 
Victim repeatedly pressured (but did 
not force) offender to engage in 
unwanted sex acts and had 
previously hit offender.  Trial judge 
did not accept offender’s account of 
the incident.  Trial judge found that 
that there was a struggle between 
the offender and victim, and that 
offender beat and stabbed victim. 
Depression.  No prior 
convictions. 
Verdict 11 years 
imprisonment 






Creamer v The 
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Offence – what induced fear 
of death/ serious injury 

















Victim and offender 








The offender and victim watched TV 
and drank for some hours. The 
victim allegedly made repeated 
sexual advances on offender and 
tried to rape offender. Offender 
proceeded to beat and stab victim.  
Intellectual disability and 
alcohol intoxication (and 
dependency). 13 prior 
convictions, including for 
assault. 
Plea 8 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
5 years 
[but for guilty 
plea, 10 years 
imprisonment and 
non-parole of 7 
years]. 











Victim hated offender and had told 
others that if offender came to his 
home he would cut him with a 
tomahawk. Offender went to victim’s 
home, struggled with victim (who 
carried a tomahawk) and hit victim 
with the tomahawk. 
 
Depressive mood disorder. No 
prior convictions.   
Verdict 11 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
7 years. 









Victim and offender 





Fight between offender, victim, 
victim’s father and others occurred 
after the party due to property 
damage. Offender believed victim 
hit offender’s father and stabbed the 
victim (even though offender’s 
father said that the victim had not hit 
him). Victim was unarmed. 
None. Plea 8 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
5 years 
[but for guilty 
plea, 10 years 
imprisonment and 
non-parole of 7 
years]. 







Victim was the uncle of 
the offender.  
Tomahawk – 2 
blows to the 
head 
Victim had been violent towards 
offender on numerous occasions 
since offender was a child.  Victim 
initiated the assault that ended in 
his death, resulting in a fight 
involving the victim (who had a 
hammer), the victim’s brother and 
Family violence, borderline 
personality disorder, PTSD, 
depression, polysubstance 
dependence.  Prior convictions 
including burglary, theft and 
false imprisonment.  
Plea 8 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole 
period of 5 years 
[but for guilty 
plea, 9 years 
imprisonment and 
   
    
 
69













Offence – what induced fear 
of death/ serious injury 







the offender, all of whom had been 
drinking alcohol.   
non-parole of 6 
years]. 
R v Edwards 







Victim was the husband 






Offender alleged that the victim 
attacked offender and threatened to 
inflict serious harm on offender 
(including burning and cutting 
offender’s eyes/ears). Offender 
alleged that the victim came at 
offender with knife. Offender 
stabbed victim multiple times killing 
him.  Trial judge had serious 
reservations about the accuracy of 
the offender’s account. 
Long history of domestic violence 
towards offender by victim. At the 
time of the victim’s death, an 
intervention order was in place 
protecting the offender from the 
victim.  
 
Significant history of psychiatric 
illness (diagnosed as bipolar 
and manic depressive). 
1 prior conviction – offender 
stabbed victim with 
corkscrew/knife. 
Plea 7 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
4 years, 9 months 
[but for guilty 
plea, 9 years and 
non-parole of 6 
years]. 







The offender was 





Victim initiated argument by making 
remarks to offender, smashing 
bottles over offender’s car and 
brandishing broken beer bottle in 
direction of the offender. Victim then 
punched offender in face three 
times. Victim then started to walk 
home and offender stabbed victim. 
None Plea 8 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
5 years, 3 months 
[but for guilty 
plea, 10 years 
and non-parole of 
6 years and 6 
months]. Note: 
sentence also 
reduced due to 
forced isolation of 
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Offence – what induced fear 
of death/ serious injury 























lump of wood) 
and fists 
Victim had machete and, with a 
friend, was intimidating a group of 
teenagers.  Offender and 2 co-
offenders intervened.  There were 
various altercations between victim 
and offenders, and victim and 
innocent bystanders.  Victim also 
caused property damage with 
machete.  One of the co-offenders 
disarmed victim, and offender and 
co-offenders assaulted victim 
repeatedly around body and head. 
 
Prior convictions in Latvia (not 
taken into account).  Previous 
convictions in Victoria including 
assault.  Severe depression, 
PTSD, suicide attempts.  
Offending in this case occurred 
2 days after release from 
prison. 
Verdict 11 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
8 years.  










Offender and victim had 
been friends, but had 
fallen out over a drug 
debt. 
Shotgun – one 
shot to the 
head 
Victim came to offender’s father’s 
office to discuss damage to the 
victim’s car.  Argument between 
victim and offender’s father.  
Offender was waiting in next room, 
where the sawn-off shotgun had 
been hidden.  Offender heard raised 
voices, entered the room and shot 
victim.  Victim was unarmed. 
PTSD resulting from kidnapping 
and torture in 2009 (note: this 
did not reduce his moral 
culpability to a significant 
degree given the planning 
involved in the offence). No 
prior convictions. 
Plea 10 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole of 
7 years [but for 
guilty plea, 12 
years and non-
parole of 9 (note: 
sentence also 











Unknown Pole or 
machete 
Fist fight between offender’s father 
and victim outside home. Offender 
intervened and struck victim 
repeatedly in the head with [a 
weapon]. 
 
Offender 14 years old at time of 
offence.  













Offender bought a car 
from the victim one 
week before his death. 
Knife (15 stab 
wounds) 
Victim intimidated offender into 
buying car from him. A week later, 
offender approached victim at train 
station and stabbed him repeatedly. 
Cognitive impairment caused 
by previous brain injury, which 
was linked to offending. No 
prior convictions. No remorse 
but unlikely to reoffend. 
Verdict 8 years 
imprisonment 
(and non parole 
period of 5 years)  
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Offence – what induced fear 









R v Moustafa 















was the cousin of the 
victim’s friend 
(Mohamad). 
Revolver Moustafa believed Mohamad (who 
was his cousin) had stolen from 
him. Victim owned a panelbeaters 
business and was friends with 
Mohamad. 
 
Moustafa and Kassab confronted 
Mohamad at the victim’s shop. 
Mohamad and the victim were both 
shot in a subsequent gunfight. 
Offenders were acquitted of 
Mohamad’s murder. 
Kassab: previously pleaded 
guilty to possessing prohibited 
weapon without approval and 
possessing dangerous article, 
‘very good’ prospects for 
rehabilitation 
Moustafa: ‘significant criminal 
history’ (e.g. conviction for 
recklessly causing serious 
injury, various driving and drug 
offences) 
Verdict 8.5 years 
imprisonment 
and non-parole 
period of 5 years 







Relationships – family v 
non family:  
Weapon type:  NA Total number of offenders with 
prior convictions: 
Total: Average head 
sentence: 
15 Offender 
M: 12, F: 3  
Victim 
M: 14, F:0 
 
Family – 5 Black: victim 
was male de facto  
Creamer: victim was 
husband 
Svetina: victim was 
father 
Monks: victim was uncle 
Edwards: victim was 
husband 
Non-family – 10 
Knife – 7 
Tomahawk – 2 
Other – 6 
 7 (not including case involving 
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